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RACE, POLICING, AND TECHNOLOGY*
I. BENNETT CAPERS**
This Essay argues that if we truly care about making policing
egalitarian and fair to everyone, then that could mean more
policing, not less. It advocates harnessing technology, including
surveillance technology, to help deracialize policing. This turn to
technology will not be cost free. Indeed, one cost will be the
redistribution of privacy. This cost, especially to those who already
enjoy a surfeit of privacy, might seem great. But even greater should
be the possibility that technology can move society closer to
egalitarian, race-free policing, and to the goal of true equality
before the law.
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INTRODUCTION
I am a black man. I say this up front because, like Patricia Williams,
I am convinced that subject position is everything in my analysis of the
law.1 I say this up front, too, because when it comes to policing, my
blackness means that I am a disturbing statistic. After all, as recently as
2013, one in three black men could expect to go to prison during his
lifetime.2 A prosecutor is more likely to seek higher charges against me,3
and a jury is more likely to convict me than a white defendant based on
similar evidence.4 According to the United States Sentencing
Commission, if I am sent to prison, I will likely receive a sentence nearly
twenty percent longer than a white offender for the same crime.5 I live in
a world in which “[y]oung + [b]lack + [m]ale” too often “ = [p]robable

1. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 3 (1991) (“Since
subject position is everything in my analysis of the law, you deserve to know that it’s a bad
morning.”).
2. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 1 (Aug. 2013), http://sentencingproject.org
/doc/publications/rd_ICCPR%20Race%20and%20Justice%20Shadow%20Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7WG2-SXG7].
3. See, e.g., BESIKI KUTATELADZE, WHITNEY TYMAS & MARY CROWLEY, VERA INST.
OF JUSTICE, RACE AND PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 3 (2014), https://storage.googleapis
.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/race-and-prosecution-in-manhattan/legacy_downloads
/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/TXQ2-WUB2] (finding race to
be a statistically significant factor in case outcomes); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race:
The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 16–17 (1998) (discussing
how prosecutorial discretion is a cause of racial injustice).
4. See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial
Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 189–90
(2010) (finding that mock jurors possessed an implicit association between “black” and
“guilty”); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 201, 217 (2001) (finding that white jurors demonstrated racial bias in non-race salient
cases).
5. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 108 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites
/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker-reports/2012-booker
/Part_A.pdf#page=55 [https://perma.cc/9X89-B3LP]; Joe Palazzolo, Racial Gaps in Men’s
Sentencing, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424127887324432004578304463789858002 [https://perma.cc/4QDB-7ZKY].
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[c]ause[,]”6 and where, as Professor Randall Kennedy has observed,
there is a “racial tax[.]”7 I accordingly carry myself knowing that I will be
watched by the police, scrutinized by the police, and that at any point I
can be stopped by the police.8 As much as I might hope that my status as
an academic might insulate me from racialized policing, my own
experience and the experiences of numerous black professors suggest
otherwise.9 After all, the police do not see an academic. They see only
what they want to see, “figments of their imagination[,]”10
“woven . . . out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories[,]”11 reducible to
this: a black man. So, I am a black man. But not tragically so.12 In a
sense, I am that black male because this is how I have been socially
constructed.13 Change the construction and liberation should be possible.
There is a final reason to foreground my blackness, here on this black
and white page: I want to make an argument that might seem
counterintuitive, that might rile libertarians and progressives, and that
might even give pause to a few black folk. What I want to argue is that, if
we truly care about making policing egalitarian and fair to everyone,
then that might mean more policing, not less. More to the point, it will
mean redistributing privacy.

6. See generally Elizabeth A. Gaynes, Essay, The Urban Criminal Justice System: Where
Young + Black + Male = Probable Cause, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621 (1993) (discussing how
young black men are disproportionately targeted in the criminal justice system).
7. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159 (1997).
8. See infra Section I.C.
9. As I have detailed elsewhere, a number of “law-abiding minority professors”—Cornel
West, William Julius Wilson, Paul Butler, and Devon Carbado, to name just a few—have been
subjected to police stops. I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race,
Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 18 (2011).
10. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 3 (rev. ed. 2002).
11. FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 111 (Charles Lam Markmann trans.,
1967).
12. See ZORA NEALE HURSTON, How It Feels to Be Colored Me, in I LOVE MYSELF
WHEN I AM LAUGHING . . . AND THEN AGAIN WHEN I AM LOOKING MEAN AND
IMPRESSIVE 152, 152 (Alice Walker ed., 1979) (“But I am not tragically colored.”).
13. Race has little inherent meaning but is largely a social construct, a point recognized
by both critical race scholars and geneticists. See, e.g., MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (2d ed. 1994) (describing racial formation as
the “sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed,
and destroyed”); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF.
L. REV. 741, 774 (1994) (“ ‘[R]ace’ is neither a natural fact simply there in ‘reality,’ nor a
wrong idea, eradicable by an act of will.”); Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of
Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
6 (1994) (critiquing “existing theories of race” and advancing “a new theory of race as a social
complex of meanings we continually replicate in our daily lives”). Ta-Nehisi Coates perhaps
put it most elegantly: “[R]ace is the child of racism, not the father.” TA-NEHISI COATES,
BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 7 (2015).
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Before elaborating, I should say that this Essay is only indirectly
about police violence, the issue most associated with the Black Lives
Matter movement and which is now part of the national zeitgeist,14
though of course that issue is an important one. In 2015 alone, police
killed over 224 unarmed men and women, almost half of them black like
me.15 Video images, captured on cellphones and dashboard cameras,
have become the nightly news in my brain, playing in an endless, “spiritmurder[ing]”16 loop. Still, as someone who has thought and written
about policing for a decade now, I know that police violence is not the
disease, but rather a symptom of the far larger problem of racialized
policing more generally.17 Every police shooting, after all, begins with a
look, a suspicion, or an encounter. We can do little to address racialized
police violence if we do nothing to address the far broader issue of
racialized looks and encounters.18
This Essay is accordingly about police looks and police encounters.
It is also about technology and how harnessing technology can help
deracialize policing. To be sure, the technology this Essay proposes
comes at a cost. In exchange for a reduction of hard surveillance of
people of color, it will require an increase in soft surveillance of

14. See, e.g., John Eligon, One Slogan, Many Methods: Black Lives Matter Enters Politics,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/us/one-slogan-manymethods-black-lives-matter-enters-politics.html [https://perma.cc/B9GN-TRPF] (discussing
the formation of the Black Lives Matter movement and its evolving relationship with national
politics).
15. See The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, GUARDIAN, http://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database
[https://perma.cc/9X7K-KL65 (staff-uploaded archive)].
16. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as
the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129–30 (1987) (examining racism as
a crime and describing it as “spirit-murder”).
17. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 849–
53 (2008) [hereinafter Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying] (discussing the
undemocratic policing and inegalitarianism of racial profiling); I. Bennett Capers, Policing,
Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 45 (2009) [hereinafter Capers, Policing,
Race, and Place] (examining how current policing methods contribute to residential
segregation); Bennett Capers, Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal Assists, 69 FLA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 29–32) [hereinafter Capers, Policing, Technology, and
Doctrinal Assists], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2760388 [https://
perma.cc/N5K6-CNBA (staff-uploaded archive)] (discussing how black and Hispanic
individuals are stopped and frisked more commonly than white individuals); Capers, supra
note 9, at 18 (discussing racial profiling by police officers).
18. Devon Carbado makes a similar point. As he notes, “ ‘front-end’ police contact
(which Fourth Amendment law enables) is often the predicate to ‘back-end’ police violence
(which Fourth Amendment law should help to prevent).” Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping
Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Violence, 105
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 103), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2844312 [https://perma.cc/856T-3NRL (staff-uploaded archive)].
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everyone.19 In short, it will require a redistribution of privacy. This might
seem too much of a sacrifice for some. It is certainly unlikely to sit well
with those who are unwilling to adopt, even temporarily, a Rawlsian
“veil of ignorance”20 and imagine what type of policing would be fair if
they themselves were black or brown.21 Absent some “interest
convergence,”22 white Americans who currently enjoy a surfeit of
privacy might balk at ceding some privacy to those who are black like
me.23 But hear me out. I do think I can make a persuasive and utilitarian
argument, even to the naysayers.
I begin, in Part I, by limning some of the problems with policing,
with a particular focus on racial profiling. But lest anyone think I am
unfairly singling out the police, I make clear that some courts have been
anything but innocent bystanders when it comes to racialized policing.
The Supreme Court, time and time again, has in effect aided and abetted
19. See Gary T. Marx, Soft Surveillance: The Growth of Mandatory Volunteerism in
Collecting Personal Information—“Hey Buddy Can You Spare a DNA?”, in SURVEILLANCE
AND SECURITY 37, 37–38 (Torin Monahan ed., 2006). The term “soft surveillance” comes
from sociologist Gary T. Marx, who uses it to refer to surveillance that relies on persuasion to
achieve compliance, increased inclusiveness of the targeted class, and an emphasis on the
needs of society as a whole over individual needs. See id. Hard surveillance, by contrast, is
marked by more direct police interaction, such as individual surveillance, stops, and frisks. Id.
20. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 136–42 (1971). In his highly influential
book, Rawls propounds a thought experiment in which citizens are behind a “veil of
ignorance” that blinds them to what attributes they might have, such as their race, sex, or
wealth. See id. at 137. Rawls writes:
It is assumed, then, that . . . no one knows his place in society, his class position or
social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his
conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special
features of his psychology . . . . More than this, I assume that the parties do not
know . . . [their society’s] economic or political situation, or the level of civilization
and culture it has been able to achieve.
Id. From this “original position” of innocence, citizens would be better positioned to imagine
a system of justice that is free from self-interest. See id. at 19.
21. For more on how such “switching” exercises—what I have elsewhere termed “cross
dressing”—might lead to a more egalitarian criminal justice system, see I. Bennett Capers,
Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 4 (2008) (arguing that “the
imaginative act of cross dressing others” can “disrupt inappropriate biases in the criminal
arena”).
22. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (noting that the interest of minorities in
achieving equality is accommodated only when it converges with the interest of the majority).
23. I am not the first to write about the unequal distribution of privacy along lines that
implicate race. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 407–12 (2003) (arguing that privacy is unequally
distributed, benefiting those with property and money in ways that correlate with race);
William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1265, 1265–67 (1999) (similar).
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racialized policing. Far from furthering a goal of equality before the law,
the Supreme Court has contributed to that goal’s very opposite, in effect
invoking a type of policing exceptionalism.24 This background informs
my argument that it is time to look elsewhere to address policing
problems. That elsewhere, as Part II makes clear, is technology. In short,
there are ways to harness technology to reduce racialized policing. Such
“techno-policing,” Part III acknowledges, will come as a cost. It will
involve widespread soft surveillance, for a start. And it will mean the
redistribution of privacy: many will have to cede some of the privacy
that they currently enjoy. Part III accordingly makes the argument that
this redistribution is a net good that ultimately will redound to
everyone’s benefit. More than that, the cost could be necessary if we
care about “mak[ing] America what America must become”25—“fair,
egalitarian, responsive to the needs of all of its citizens, and truly
democratic in all respects, including its policing[.]”26
I. RACE AND THE WAY WE POLICE NOW
For many Americans, the recent spate of police acts of violence
against those of us who are black and brown has been, quite simply, an
education. Captured on cellphones and dashboard cameras, these acts of
violence have become part of the national news, sparking a national
conversation about policing and race.
But for other Americans, for those of us of a darker hue, for those
of us on “the bottom[,]”27 for those of us marked as policed, the spate of
police violence is not news. Nor is it new. Such acts of violence are part
of our “pools of knowledge[,]”28 talked about in barbershops and hair
salons, on church pews and on street corners, and yes, in prisons. Such
racialized police violence is “a constant reminder of the space between
24. See infra Section I.D.
25. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 9 (Modern Library ed. 1995) (1962)
(“[G]reat men have done great things here, and will again, and we can make America what
America must become.”).
26. Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, supra note 17, at 880.
27. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (“Looking to the bottom—adopting the
perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise [of a neutral
application of the law]—can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the
phenomenology of law and defining the elements of justice.”).
28. See David R. Maines, Information Pools and Racialized Narrative Structures, 40 SOC.
Q. 317, 319–20 (1999) (noting that information is often race based, with blacks being privy to
certain information that is largely unknown by whites, and vice versa); see also Russell K.
Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1120 (2008) (“In general, black
and white people obtain information through different informational networks, which results
in racialized pools of knowledge.”).
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freedom and ‘unfreedom,’ where the contested citizenship of African
Americans is held.”29 It is why so many black and brown parents teach
their kids that, when it comes to policing, the notion that we are all
equal before the law might be someone’s reality. But it is not theirs.
For those of us who are black and brown, it is hard to imagine a
time when there was not a problem with police violence, whether it was
the casual cruelty of overseers,30 the violence inflicted by slave patrols,31
or the extralegal justice in the form of lynchings that lasted well into the
1950s.32 But it is the problem of policing in the last half-century that I
focus on here. Below, I briefly discuss three of those problems—police
violence, underenforcement, and racial profiling—with particular
attention to racial profiling. I then turn to the subordinating role the
Supreme Court has played with respect to these issues. Far from
furthering its claimed goal of a color-blind Constitution,33 the Court has
effectively given its blessing to the opposite.34
A. Police Violence
On October 13, 2015, at a Democratic primary presidential debate,
each of the candidates responded to a recorded question on whether
“[b]lack lives . . . matter.”35 Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders responded,
“The reason those words matter is the African-American community
knows that on any given day some innocent person like Sandra Bland
can get into a car and then three days later she’s going to end up dead in
29. KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM #BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK
LIBERATION 108 (2016).
30. EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE
14–18 (First Vintage Books ed. 1976) (1972).
31. Scholars have noted that “the targeting of African Americans in particular is
reminiscent of the slave patrols that demanded ‘passes’ from blacks found in public spaces.”
SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS 117 (2001); see also ANDREW E. TASLITZ,
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 106 (2006) (discussing slave patrols); Joe R.
Feagin, The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places, 56
AM. SOC. REV. 101, 102 (1991) (discussing public sites of discrimination).
32. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY
OF RACIAL TERROR 5 (2d ed. 2015) (determining that 4,075 racial terror lynchings occurred
in twelve southern states between 1877 and 1950); see also NAACP, THIRTY YEARS OF
LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1889–1918, at 7–8 (1919) (determining that 3,224 people
were killed by lynching mobs between 1889 and 1918).
33. For an examination and a critique of cases claiming this ideal, see generally Neil
Gotunda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991)
(arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s use of color-blind constitutionalism fosters
white racial domination).
34. See infra Section I.D.
35. Reena Flores, Democratic Debate: Do Black Lives Matter?, CBSNEWS.COM (Oct. 13,
2015, 11:50 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/democratic-debate-do-black-lives-matter/
[https://perma.cc/K9UA-3NF4].
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jail or their kids are going to get shot[.]”36 He added, “We need to
combat institutional racism from top to bottom and we need major,
major reforms in a broken criminal justice system.”37 Former Maryland
Governor Martin O’Malley also weighed in, agreeing that “[b]lack lives
matter” and adding, “[W]e have a lot of work to do to reform our
criminal justice system and to address race relations in our country.”38
For her part, Hillary Clinton, who had previously met with Black Lives
Matter activists, advocated for the more widespread adoption of policeworn body cameras.39
There is a reason why “black lives matter” has become part of the
national conversation, and it has much to do with acts of police violence
captured on video. These acts include the fatal death of Eric Garner,
who died after being placed in a prohibited chokehold by Officer Daniel
Pantaleo in Staten Island, New York, on July 17, 2014.40 Garner’s crime
was selling loose cigarettes on the street.41 They include the police
shooting death of Walter Scott, who was shot in the back by police
officer Michael Slager in North Charleston, South Carolina on April 4,
2015.42 Scott’s crime was having a “broken brake light.”43 They include
the police shooting of Laquan McDonald, the seventeen-year-old
teenager who was recorded getting shot in the back sixteen times in
fifteen seconds by police officer Jason Van Dyke on October 20, 2014.44
McDonald’s crime was walking down the block with a knife with his
back to the police.45 They include the video of Dajerria Becton, the
fifteen-year old teenage girl who was body slammed to the ground by a

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Eric Bradner & Dan Merica, Clinton on Facebook: “Black Lives Matter” and Other
Takeaways, CNN (July 21, 2015, 2:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/20/politics/hillaryclinton-facebook-black-lives-matter/index.html [https://perma.cc/EK38-4SZZ].
40. Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path
to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14
/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5V3X-XUPB].
41. Id.
42. Dana Ford, South Carolina Ex-Police Officer Indicted in Walter Scott Killing, CNN
(June 8, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/08/us/south-carolina-slager-indictmentwalter-scott/ [https://perma.cc/E3EE-QLY2].
43. Id.
44. Wayne Drash, The Killing of Laquan McDonald: The Dashcam Video vs. Police
Accounts, CNN (Dec. 19, 2015, 12:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/us/laquanmcdonald-video-records-comparison/ [https://perma.cc/2MKE-NASX]. Video of this shooting
is available online. Warning, Graphic Content: Laquan McDonald Shooting Dash-Cam Video,
CHI. TRIBUNE, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-laquan-mcdonaldpolice-dashboard-short-video-premiumvideo.html [https://perma.cc/ECU8-EYG5].
45. Id.
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Texas police officer at a graduation pool party.46 Becton’s crime was
crashing the pool party with other teenagers.47 And they include the
cellphone-captured video of Shakara,48 the sixteen-year-old foster
student who was flipped out of her desk and dragged across a room by
Senior Deputy Ben Fields, a school resource officer.49 Her crime was not
putting away her cell phone in class quickly enough.50
For those of us who are black or brown, these acts of violence are
anything but new. After all, even before the advent of ubiquitous
smartphones, dashboard cameras, and body worn cameras, video
recordings existed, though they were rare. For example, in 1991,
videotaped images of several Los Angeles police officers beating
Rodney King with billy clubs, kicking him, and stunning him with a
Taser “stun gun” were captured on a neighbor’s camcorder.51 There was
also the 2005 police beating of sixty-four-year-old Robert Davis in
Louisiana, which happened to be caught on camera by an Associated
Press television news crew.52 But even when police violence was not
caught on tape, even when there was no “white witness” (to borrow
Lolita Buckner Innis’s term for the role cameras now play),53 those of us
46. Carol Cole-Frowe & Richard Fausset, Jarring Image of Police’s Use of Force at Texas
Pool Party, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/us/mckinney-texpool-party-dispute-leads-to-police-officer-suspension.html [https://perma.cc/6TW8-5H2J].
47. Id.
48. Jenny Jarvie, Girl Thrown from Desk Didn’t Obey Because the Punishment Was
Unfair, Attorney Says, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015, 11:53 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation
/la-na-girl-thrown-punishment-unfair-20151029-story.html [https://perma.cc/F6EV-NYFZ
(staff-uploaded archive)] (noting that her attorney identified the minor by her first name,
Shakara).
49. Alan Blinder, Ben Fields, South Carolina Deputy, Fired over Student Arrest, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/south-carolina-deputy-benfields-fired.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TV8D-DFJR]; Polly Mosendz, Report: South Carolina
Student Flipped by Police Officer Is in Foster Care, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 28, 2015, 4:29 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/south-carolina-student-flipped-police-officer-foster-care-388119
[https://perma.cc/NXQ7-NMLY].
50. Id.
51. See Seth Mydans, Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at A1; Hector Tobar & Richard Lee Colvin, Witnesses Depict
Relentless Beating, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at B1. As a result of this beating, King suffered
eleven broken bones at the base of his skull, a fractured cheekbone, and a broken leg. The
Rodney King Affair, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-24/local
/me-1422_1_king-s-injuries-officer-laurence-m-powell-beating [https://perma.cc/MFL7-AJNG].
52. See Christine Hauser & Christopher Drew, 3 Police Officers Deny Battery Charges
After Videotaped Beating in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at A16.
53. As Lolita Buckner Inniss observes,
[v]ideo surveillance sometimes provides much needed valorization for . . . less
regarded private people [those possessing little power or authority]. This is because
private people are far more often lied about, lied to and deemed liars. Hence private
people often lose in battles of opposing narratives with public people about what has
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who are black and brown knew. Even absent a tape, we knew about and
felt viscerally the fatal shooting of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed
immigrant from Guinea, who was shot forty-one times while attempting
to identify himself by displaying his wallet.54 Even without a video, we
fretted over the shooting of Sean Bell by police officers the day before
his wedding.55 In 1999, no one recorded Officer Justin Volpe sodomizing
Abner Louima with a broomstick in a station house bathroom, requiring
three operations and two months of hospitalization, because the officer
mistakenly believed Louima had punched him earlier, but still we
shuddered.56 Nor were there cameras to capture the police shooting of
sixty-six-year old Eleanor Bumpurs, an arthritic woman who resisted
being evicted from her apartment.57 When Bumpurs refused to open the
door, the police broke the door and tried to subdue her, eventually
shooting her twice with a 12-gauge shotgun.58 Even now, we know, even
if other Americans do not, that most police violence continues to go
unrecorded59 and that the common denominator is the color blue, not
black or white.60 We know police violence is far more widespread than
occurred. In such cases, video surveillance becomes a mostly neutral, unlikely to lie,
legitimizing witness. For many of these private people, especially women, people of
color or other relatively powerless people, especially women, people of color or other
relatively powerless people in society, video surveillance is the modern day white
witness.
Lolita Buckner Innis, Video Surveillance as White Witnesses, AIN’T I A FEMINIST LEGAL
SCHOLAR TOO? (Sept. 30, 2012), http://innissfls.blogspot.com/2012/09/video-surveillance-aswhite-witnesses.html [https://perma.cc/7NJN-ZFXA].
54. See Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man Is Killed,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1; Amy Waldman, A Hard Worker with a Gentle Smile, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at B5; Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo
Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com
/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-diallo-shooting-are-acquitted-allcharges.html [https://perma.cc/DK5P-YYUA].
55. See William K. Rashbaum & Al Baker, 50 Bullets, One Dead, and Many Questions,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at B1.
56. See David Barstow, Officer, Seeking Mercy, Admits to Louima’s Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1999, at A1; Joseph P. Fried, Volpe Sentenced to a 30-Year Term in Louima Torture,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at A1; Leonard Levitt, The Louima Verdicts: Some Splits, But Blue
Wall Stands, NEWSDAY, June 9, 1999, at A4. Officer Justin Volpe eventually pleaded guilty to
sodomizing Louima; a second officer was convicted aiding in the assault. See Fried, supra, at
A1.
57. Selwyn Raab, Officer Indicted in Bumpers Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 1985), http://
www.nytimes.com/1985/02/01/nyregion/officer-indicted-in-bumpurs-case.html [https://perma
.cc/P4PX-RYMJ].
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Black, White, and Blue: Americans’ Attitudes on Race and Police, ROPER
CTR. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/black-white-blue-americans-attitudesrace-police/ [https://perma.cc/XDZ5-LR8A].
60. Minority officers are not exempt from engaging in racial profiling or using excessive
force, as demonstrated by the shooting of Sean Bell by minority officers, the more recent
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the videos that, through the happenstance of a camera or witnesses,
make the evening news.61 This police violence surrounds us, at least
those of us who are black or brown. To us, we look forward to the day
when police violence is, in fact, “news.”62 Now, it is only new to those
too young to know that there is not yet equality under the law. So we tell
our sons and daughters, but especially our sons: “It’s unlikely but
possible that you could get killed today. Or any day. I’m sorry, but that’s
the truth. Black maleness is a potentially fatal condition.”63 We tell
them, as Ta-Nehisi Coates tells his son in his brutally honest Between the
World and Me,
the police departments of your country have been endowed with
the authority to destroy your body. It does not matter if the
destruction is the result of an unfortunate overreaction. It does
not matter if it originates in a misunderstanding. It does not
shooting of Keith Lamont Scott in Charlotte, North Carolina, and prosecution of officers in
the Freddie Gray case. See, e.g., Sean Bell Shooting: Lessons from a Tragedy, NEWSWEEK
(Apr. 24, 2008, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/sean-bell-shooting-lessons-tragedy-86351
[https://perma.cc/JF4U-2KMR]; see also Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, Charlotte Officer
‘Justified’ in Fatal Shooting of Keith Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www
.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/us/charlotte-officer-acted-lawfully-in-fatal-shooting-of-keith-scott.html
[https://perma.cc/59ST-HVSP] (noting that the officer who fired the fatal shot is black); Derek
Hawkins, Lynh Bui & Peter Hermann, Baltimore Prosecutors Drop All Remaining Charges in
Freddie Gray Case, WASH. POST (July 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/public-safety/baltimore-prosecutors-drop-all-remaining-charges-in-freddie-gray-case/2016
/07/27/b5c10f34-b655-4d40-87e6-80827e2f0e2d_story.html?utm_term=.8f3f6662a23e [https://
perma.cc/9GCP-8WMR] (observing that three of the six charged officers are black). Nor
should this be surprising. Social cognition research suggests that almost everyone, regardless
of race, has implicit biases. See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of
Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 752–54 (2001).
Performance theory provides a second explanation. In short, to make themselves acceptable
to fellow officers, minority officers may “perform” as they believe majority officers would. See
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112
YALE L.J. 1757, 1792–93 (2003) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Critical Race Theory]
(reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco
Valdes et al. eds., 2002)). For more on performance theory and how it rewards minorities who
engage in assimilationist and “comfort strategies” to fit in, including strategies that are
harmful to their minority group, see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1300–01 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity].
Also, employers are more likely to hire minority officers who are “racially palatable” and
accept majority norms. Carbado & Gulati, Critical Race Theory, supra, at 1793. For more on
this phenomenon, see id. at 1792–93.
61. For an aggregation of statistics on police violence, see MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE,
http://mappingpoliceviolence.org/ [https://perma.cc/S4QJ-GMNQ] (last updated Jan. 1, 2017).
62. See News, MERIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/news [https://perma.cc/56DN-RZM8] (designating “news” as meaning “previously
unknown information”).
63. Touré, How to Talk to Young Black Boys about Trayvon Martin, TIME (Mar. 21,
2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/03/21/how-to-talk-to-young-black-boys-about-trayvonmartin/ [https://perma.cc/2L92-VUTN].
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matter if the destruction springs from a foolish policy. Sell
cigarettes without the proper authority and your body can be
destroyed. Resent the people trying to entrap your body and it
can be destroyed. Turn into a dark stairwell and your body can be
destroyed. The destroyers will rarely be held accountable. Mostly
they will receive pensions. And destruction is merely the
superlative form of a dominion whose prerogatives include
friskings, detaining, beatings, and humiliations. All of this is
common to black people. And all of this is old for black people.
No one is held responsible.64
B.

Underenforcement

For those of us of a darker hue, there is another issue we know
intimately: the issue of underenforcement, or the failure of the state to
provide communities with equal protection of the criminal laws.65 It is an
issue that Jill Leovy, a white journalist, recently explored in her widely
praised exposé, Ghettoside.66 But again, for black and brown folk, the
problem is an old one. Even before Professor Randall Kennedy
observed that “the principle injury suffered by African-Americans in
relation to criminal matters is not overenforcement but
underenforcement of the laws[,]”67 the group Public Enemy was rapping
“911 is a Joke[,]”68 Tracy Chapman was singing in “Behind the Wall”
that “the police always come late/If they come at all[,]”69 and James
Baldwin was noting that the police “certainly do not protect the lives or
property of Negroes[.]”70 In short, black and brown folk have known
that underenforcement pervades every level of criminal justice.
64. COATES, supra note 13, at 9.
65. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716–22 (2006);
see also DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 139–41 (2008)
(“[I]nadequate policing can be as much a threat to democracy as overly harsh policing.”). This
underenforcement can take numerous forms, including the failure to diligently investigate and
prosecute cases involving minority victims, and the failure to seek adequate punishment in
cases involving minority victims. This underenforcement contributes to what Monica Bell
describes as “legal cynicism,” the feeling shared by many African Americans that they are
“essentially stateless, unprotected by the law and its enforcers, marginal to the project of
making American society.” Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal
Cynicism, 126 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1–2) (on file with author).
66. JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE 8–12, 316–19 (2015) (using a homicide in South Los
Angeles to explore the larger issue of homicide rates in poor, black communities, larger
society’s historical indifference to such homicides, and arguing for greater state intervention
in providing the type of policing that provides justice to these black victims).
67. KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 19.
68. PUBLIC ENEMY, 911 Is a Joke, on FEAR OF A BLACK PLANET (Def Jam Records
1990).
69. TRACY CHAPMAN, Behind the Wall, on TRACY CHAPMAN (Elektra Records 1988).
70. James Baldwin, Fear of the Police, PAGEANT, Dec. 1964, at 188–89.
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And studies validate our “pools of knowledge.”71 Consider capital
punishment, often considered an example of overenforcement by white
progressives.72 Black and brown communities also understand capital
punishment as yet another example of underenforcement.73 In a sense,
the Baldus study of death penalty prosecutions in Georgia confirmed
what those of us who are black and brown already knew: prosecutors
were less likely to seek the death penalty in cases involving minority
victims, and even when they did seek it, jurors were less likely to
recommend death.74 We might have not realized the magnitude of the
disparity—that, even after taking into account non-racial variables,
“defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to
receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks.”75
But that black and brown lives were not valued like white lives, even in
courts of law—that we knew.
Studies have revealed similar patterns of underenforcement in rape
cases. For example, there is Gary LaFree’s oft-cited study, Rape and
Criminal Justice.76 Examining the impact of race in processing decisions
in 881 forcible sex offenses reported to the Indianapolis police during a
three-year period, LaFree found that although black men accused of
assaulting black women accounted for forty-five percent of the reported
rapes, they accounted for only seventeen percent of all men who
received sentences of six years or more.77 By contrast, black men
accused of assaulting white women accounted for “[fifty] percent of all
men who received sentences of six or more years.”78 That black victims
were comparatively undervalued remained true even when LaFree
71. Robinson, supra note 28, at 1120.
72. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for
Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 323 (2010)
(considering the possibility of the death penalty being overenforced in wealthy localities).
73. Cf. Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1391–93 (1988) (observing that race of victim
disparities in capital punishment prosecutions indicate a devaluation of black victims and that
black communities are “disadvantaged by the relative leniency extended to killers of blacks”).
74. DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 4 (1990) (“[O]ur research convinces us that in the
absence of some . . . system of oversight, a substantial level of arbitrary and discriminatory
death sentencing under the laws as currently drawn is inevitable.”); see also Barbara O’Brien
et al., Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging and Sentencing in North Carolina,
1990–2009, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (2016) (“The analysis here strongly suggests that in
death-eligible murder cases with at least one white victim, defendants are more likely to be
sentenced to death than all other cases.”). The Baldus study is cited and formed the basis for
the challenge to the death penalty in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
75. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
76. GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1989).
77. Id. at 129, 133.
78. Id.
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controlled for other factors, including whether the defendant and victim
were strangers.79
Again, this underenforcement permeates every aspect of the
criminal justice system when it comes to victims who are black or brown,
whether they are victims of burglary or vandalism, assault or fraud.80 As
Alexandra Natapoff has observed, all of this has the expressive effect of
“send[ing] an official message of dismissal and devaluation.”81
C.

Racial Profiling

Though the two problems I have discussed so far—police violence
and underenforcement—are important, I want to focus on a third
problem, although I will return to the first two later. I focus on this third
problem, racial profiling, for several reasons. One, it seems clear that
isolated incidents of police violence, while problems in themselves, are
also symptomatic of a much larger problem of racialized policing in
general. To put this differently, acts of police violence tend to begin with
racialized encounters, stops, frisks, and arrests.82 Two, to the extent the
problem of underenforcement is one of resources and priorities, it might
be that the best way to counter that problem is by first addressing
aggressive racial profiling tactics so that resources can be redirected to
tackle actual crime. Three, I focus on racial profiling because the
evidence here is abundant and points in one direction. The data
discussed below confirm what black and brown communities long ago
dubbed “Walking While Black” and “Driving While Black[.]”83 When it
comes to racial profiling, the numbers are the argument.
79. See id. at 135–43.
80. Natapoff, supra note 65, at 1722–31. Even 911 response times might depend on the
race of the neighborhood, as a recent internal report of the Milwaukee Police Department
demonstrated. See Colleen Henry, MPD Report Says South Side 911 Calls Answered Twice as
Fast as North Side, WISN (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.wisn.com/article/mpd-report-sayssouth-side-911-calls-answered-twice-as-fast-as-north-side/6329541 [https://perma.cc/33HHAMSU].
81. Natapoff, supra note 65, at 1749.
82. This connection between front-end policing and back-end police violence has not
been lost on scholars. See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 18 (manuscript at 103); Alice Ristroph,
The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 10),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2847300 [https://perma.cc/Y24G-6DS3
(staff-uploaded archive)] (discussing the short, “thin blue line from an initial police-civilian
encounter to an officer’s authorization to use deadly force”).
83. For one of the early and seminal discussions of these phenomena, see David A.
Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 265, 265 (1999). For Latinos, there is also the phenomenon known as “Driving While
Brown[.]” Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While Brown: A Proposal for Ending Racial
Profiling in Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2005)
(discussing the profiling of Latinos).
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Consider the numbers from Floyd v. City of New York,84 a recent
class-action suit challenging the New York City police department’s
aggressive stop-and-frisk practices as violating the Fourth Amendment
and the equal protection clause.85 Between January 2004 and June 2012,
the New York City Police Department made over 4.4 million forcible
stops of individuals, 83% of whom were black or Hispanic.86 To put this
in perspective, stops of whites, if spread across the population of New
York City, would amount to stops of approximately 2.6% of the white
population.87 By contrast, stops of blacks spread across the population of
New York City would amount to stops of approximately 21.1% of the
population.88
Nor is New York alone. Studies have found evidence of racial
profiling in Los Angeles: a study by Professor Ian Ayres found that the
stop rate was 3,400 stops higher per 10,000 residents for blacks than for
whites, and almost 360 stops higher for Hispanics than for whites, even
after controlling for variables such as the rate of violent and property
crimes.89 In Philadelphia, a recent review of pedestrian stops found that
80.23% of the stops were of minorities, far greater than their
representation in the population.90 In Minnesota, a study found that
black drivers were stopped 214% more than expected and Latino drivers
95% more than expected.91 In Maryland, a report by the Maryland State
Police found that African-Americans comprised 72.9% of all of the

84. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
85. Id. at 556.
86. Id. at 556, 558. This number is likely conservative, since officers sometimes neglect to
document each stop. See id. at 559; see also First Report of the Monitor, Floyd v. City of New
York at 5, No. 1:08-cv-01034 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2015), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files
/attach/2015/07/Floyd%20Monitors%20Report%207%209%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9GLQ-SSLB] (“NYPD has conducted several precinct audits and concluded that some stops
were made but not documented.”).
87. See Press Release, Analysis of New NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Data Reveals Dramatic
Impact on Black New Yorkers, ACLU N.Y. (Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice
/racialprofiling/33095prs20071126.html [https://perma.cc/DE9B-XN34]; cf. Floyd, 959 F. Supp.
2d at 558–59 (describing the number of blacks stopped in New York City between 2004 and
2012).
88. See id.
89. IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE
OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 27 (Oct. 2008), https://www
.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/11837125-LAPD-RacialProfiling-Report-ACLU.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9GK-7BTU].
90. See Plaintiff’s Fifth Report to Court and Monitor of Stop and Frisk Practices, Bailey
v. City of Philadelphia at 13, C.A. No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2015), https://www
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-PA-0013-0005.pdf [https://perma.cc/W52Y-8NCV].
91. David Montgomery, Data Dive: Racial Disparities in Minnesota Traffic Stops,
TWINCITIES.COM (July 8, 2016, 5:46 PM), http://www.twincities.com/2016/07/08/data-diveracial-disparities-in-minnesota-traffic-stops/ [https://perma.cc/FER2-797D].
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drivers stopped and searched along a stretch of I-95, even though they
comprised only 17.5% of the drivers violating traffic laws on the road.92
In Boston, an analysis of more than 200,000 Boston Police Department
records of police-citizen encounters (which include observations,
interrogations, stops, frisks, and searches) revealed that blacks were
subjected to 63% of these encounters even though they make up just
24% of Boston’s population.93 In Texas, an analysis of fifteen million
traffic stops showed that Hispanic drivers were 33% more likely to be
subjected to searches than whites.94 In New Jersey, statistician John
Lamberth’s study revealed that black drivers along I-95 were 4.85 times
as likely to be stopped as similarly situated whites.95 In Greensboro,
North Carolina, an analysis of tens of thousands of traffic stops and
arrest data also found “wide racial difference in measure after measure
of police conduct.”96 Even a liberal enclave like San Francisco is not
immune. There, a U.S. Department of Justice study recently found that
black drivers were 24% more likely to be stopped than their
proportional representation in the population would suggest.97 Similar

92. See JOHN LAMBERTH, ACLU IN THE COURTS: REPORT OF JOHN LAMBERTH, PH.D.
(Oct. 4, 2000), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-MD-0003-0006.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DRD9-FCSC]; see also Review of Federal Asset Forfeiture Program: Hearing Before
the Legis. and Nat’l Sec. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 103d Cong. 356–71
(1993) (discussing a study from Florida that showed that eighty percent of drivers whose cars
were searched in 1991 were black or Hispanic).
93. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BLACK, BROWN, AND TARGETED: A REPORT ON
BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT STREET ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007–2010, at 1 (Oct. 2014),
https://aclum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/reports-black-brown-and-targeted.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JD43-5VJG].
94. Eric Dexheimer, DPS Searches Hispanics More, Finds Less, Statesmen Analysis
Shows, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMEN (Dec. 5, 2015, 1:53 PM), http://www.mystatesman.com
/news/crime--law/dps-searches-hispanics-more-finds-less-statesman-analysis-shows
/VClFavaf6lzhsv4jKuFbaK/ [https://perma.cc/G3QJ-G53F].
95. See John Lamberth, Driving While Black: A Statistician Proves That Prejudice Still
Rules the Road, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 32, 32–33 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael
D. White eds., 2010).
96. See Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving
While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racialdisparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html [https://perma.cc/FTH9-JEMJ]. For more evidence
of racial profiling in North Carolina, see Frank. R. Baumgartner et al., Targeting Young Men
of Color for Search and Arrest During Traffic Stops: Evidence from North Carolina, 2002–
2013, POLITICS, GROUPS, AND IDENTITIES 5–17 (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum
/articles/PGI-2016-Targeting.pdf [https://perma.cc/2464-V9SM].
97. CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COLLABORATIVE
REFORM INITIATIVE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 76
(Oct. 2016), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0817-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc
/X5ZP/VTQZ]; Matt Zapotosky, Justice Department Report Blasts San Francisco Police,
WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justicedepartment-report-blasts-san-francisco-police/2016/10/12/becb841c-90a2-11e6-a6a3-d50061aa9fae
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racial disparities have been found in a host of other jurisdictions, both
large and small.98
D. Juridical Subordination
Standing alone, any one of these problems—police violence,
underenforcement, and racial profiling—would be disconcerting and at
odds with our goal of equality before the law. But it is the role that the
Supreme Court has played in this state of affairs that warrants further
scrutiny. The Court has not been an innocent bystander to unequal
policing. Rather, the Court has been a facilitator, engaging in what Roy
Brooks refers to as “juridical subordination[.]”99
The Supreme Court’s facilitation of unequal policing is certainly
true with respect to police violence. Confronted with evidence of
systemic police violence, the Court has repeatedly erected roadblocks.
For example, when confronted with a class action suit seeking injunctive
relief against police brutality, the Court in Rizzo v. Goode100 held that,
despite the past pervasiveness of police brutality, similar future behavior
was too speculative to warrant injunctive relief.101 The Court then
reaffirmed this holding in Los Angeles v. Lyons.102 And in Graham v.
Conner,103 the Court ruled that the amount of force officers are entitled
to use must be construed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene,”104 a standard that is by definition self-serving and easily

_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_sanfran-1030pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory [https://
perma.cc/2FA3-Q8YK].
98. See Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, supra note 17, at 850–51 & n.86 (citing
to jurisdictions); see also Harris, supra note 83, at 277–88 (describing reports from several
states).
99. See ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING FROM LEGAL
FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 188 (1st ed. 2002) (defining the term to mean “structural
limitations that disadvantage outsiders”).
100. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
101. Id. at 375–76.
102. 461 U.S. 95, 103–05 (1983) (holding lower court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Lyon’s claim for injunctive relief barring the use of chokeholds by Los Angeles officers; prior
use of chokeholds, including against Lyons, could not establish a real and immediate threat
that police would again use a chokehold against Lyons personally). In 1994, Congress restored
some potential for injunctive relief by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 14141 as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which empowers the U.S. Attorney General to
seek injunctive relief against police departments based on a pattern or practice of misconduct
depriving persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. See 42
U.S.C. § 14141 (2012). For more on the application of this provision, see Barbara E.
Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 525–
33 (2004).
103. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
104. Id. at 396.
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manipulated to benefit police officers.105 Perhaps most troubling, in
Screws v. United States,106 the Court read 18 U.S.C. § 242 (formerly 18
U.S.C. § 52), which prohibits depriving a person’s rights under the color
of law, as requiring proof that a police officer had “a specific intent to
deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other
rule of law[.]”107
The Court has played a similar role with respect to
underenforcement. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services,108 the Court effectively shut down the main avenue for
citizens to protest underenforcement through the court system when it
made clear that there is no due process “right” to state protection from
105. For example, police are often trained to assume that lethal force may be used when a
dangerous person is within twenty-one feet of an officer. See John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and
Executioner: The Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers, 21 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R.
155, 175–76 (2016). This twenty-one feet rule, familiar to officers, thus may be invoked to
justify a shooting as “reasonable” even where the facts standing alone do not lend themselves
to reasonableness. See id. For a discussion of how this rule allows police to be hyper-defensive
and serves to “justify” shootings, see Nancy C. Marcus, Out of Breath and down to the Wire: A
Call for Constitution-Focused Police Reform, 59 HOWARD L.J. 5, 11 (2015). See also Gross,
supra, at 169–76.
106. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
107. Id. at 103. In Screws, a Georgia sheriff, along with two deputies, bludgeoned to death
a handcuffed black man. Id. at 92–93. When local authorities failed to investigate the killing,
federal authorities stepped in and charged the sheriff with violating 18 U.S.C. § 242 (formerly
18 U.S.C. § 52), which prohibits violence under color of law. Id. at 93. However, the Supreme
Court vacated the conviction, finding that the statute was impermissibly vague and that to
save the statute from unconstitutionality, a “specific intent to deprive a person of a federal
right made definite by decision or other rule of law” must be read into the statute. Id. at 103.
As commentators have noted, on remand, the jury was presented with the same evidence but
this time was instructed that it must find that the sheriff, in bludgeoning the handcuffed
prisoner to death, had the specific intent to deprive the prisoner of a constitutional right. See
ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 114–15 (1947); Frederick M.
Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67
TUL. L. REV. 2113, 2186 & n.329 (1999). Faced with this hurdle, the jury was reported to have
acquitted. Id. Since Screws, prosecutions of officers under § 242 have been rare, in part
because of the difficulty in proving that an officer acted with the requisite mens rea, as Paul
Chevigny has observed of § 242 prosecutions:
To get a conviction, the [federal] prosecution must prove “specific intent” on the part
of the local official to violate a federal right, as distinct, for example, from an intent
simply to assault the victim. . . . The usual difficulties in prosecuting police in any
system, combined with the high standard of intent and the deference to local
prosecutors, mean that federal criminal law contributes little to the accountability of
local police for acts of violence.
PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 107–08
(1995). For more on the impact of Screws, see Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures:
The Circumvention of Just Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 722 (1996);
David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives
in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 19–20 (1999).
108. 489 U.S. 189 (1999).
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private violence,109 a ruling that certainly disadvantages the poor and
minorities who are least likely to be able to afford private protection.
The Court reaffirmed that decision in Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales,110 a suit brought by a brown woman111 after the police ignored
her calls that her husband had violated a restraining order and
kidnapped her children; during the several hours the police ignored her
calls, her husband killed the children.112 The Court reiterated that she
did not have a right to protection and thus could not claim a due process
violation.113
All of these cases exacerbate the problem of underenforcement in
minority communities. That minority communities do not receive the
same protection from the police that other communities receive might
be unfair. But it is not actionable under the due process clause. Nor is it
likely to fare better under the equal protection clause, given the Court’s
decisions in United States v. Armstrong,114 which required plaintiffs to
meet the exacting burden of establishing that similarly situated
individuals of a different race were treated differently and that such
different treatment was motivated by a discriminatory purpose;115 and in
McCleskey v. Kemp,116 which essentially insulated unequal treatment
from review in deference to prosecutorial discretion.117 In a society of
negative rights,118 the Court has made it clear that minorities should not
expect recourse through the judicial system.

109. Id. at 195. Although DeShaney involved the failure of a state agency to protect a child
from abuse, the Court’s holding was broad. The Court stated that “nothing in the language of
the Due Process Clause itself requires the state to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors.” Id.
110. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
111. The suit was brought by Jessica Gonzales, who identifies as “a Latina and Native
woman[.]” See Testimony of Jessica Lenahan, INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 5
(Oct. 22, 2008), http://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rightsinstitute/files/Gonzalesdocs/jess%20statement%20merits%20hearing.pdf [https://perma.cc
/P9LA-DYFW].
112. Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768–69 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
“did not create a system by which police departments [can be] generally held financially
accountable for crimes that better policing might have prevented”); see also David A.
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1280–87 (1999) (describing traditional
view that police protection is immune from due process claims).
113. Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768.
114. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
115. See id. at 465.
116. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
117. See id. at 297.
118. The negative rights theory to constitutionalism, which the Supreme Court has
repeatedly endorsed, posits that the state is under no constitutional obligation to provide
services to its polity. See Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the
Due Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982, 983 (1996) (quoting Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715

95 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2017)

1260

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

It is the Court’s role in enabling racial profiling, however, that has
had the most pernicious effect on unequal policing. Consider Terry v.
Ohio.119 The issue before the Warren Court was a straightforward one:
Did the police violate the Fourth Amendment when they detained Terry
and his companion, both African-American,120 in the absence of
probable cause to believe that they had committed a crime?121 On its
face, such a seizure of Terry and his companion—an officer had
observed them engaged in the noncriminal act of peering in a store
window—would seem to violate the Fourth Amendment, which at the
time was understood as requiring probable cause as the predicate to a
search or seizure.122 To get around this hurdle, the Court began one of its
earliest shifts to focusing on the reasonableness clause of the Fourth
Amendment.123 By doing so, the Court was able to assert that the Fourth
Amendment, rather than containing a blanket probable cause
requirement, permitted courts to balance the needs of the police against
the intrusions to the individual.124 With this judicial legerdemain, the
Court noted rising crime rates and used that as a justification to permit
officers to conduct forcible stops, even in the absence of probable
cause.125 Rather, a standard less than probable cause—a standard
entirely absent from the text of the Fourth Amendment—would

F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983)) (describing the negative liberties approach to
constitutionalism).
119. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
120. Interestingly, the Court made no mention of the race of Terry or his companion.
Even if race was not surfaced, however, it was clearly just below the surface. For an analysis of
the Court’s decision to elide race in Terry, see Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 967–68 (1999).
121. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 11.
122. It is telling, for example, that the draft opinion Chief Justice Warren circulated to his
colleagues analyzed the case in terms of whether the officer had probable cause. See John Q.
Barrett, Terry v. Ohio: The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness of Police Stops and Frisks
Based on Less Than Probable Cause, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 295, 304–05 (Carol
S. Steiker ed., 2006). Similarly, it is telling that Justice Douglas, in his dissent from the final
opinion, noted that the majority’s decision was “water[ing] down constitutional guarantees
and giv[ing] the police the upper hand.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the Court’s abandonment of the normal probable cause requirement, see Tracey
Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1278 (1998); see also Paul Butler, “A Long Step Down the Totalitarian
Path”: Justice Douglas’s Great Dissent in Terry v. Ohio, 79 MISS. L.J. 9, 22 (2009) (noting that
the court declined to apply the relatively high standard of probable cause in Terry).
123. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–37
(1967)); Butler, supra note 122, at 20–21 (discussing the shift to a “reasonable suspicion”
standard in Terry).
124. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21.
125. See id. at 23–24.
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suffice.126 So long as an officer could articulate reasonable suspicion to
believe that “criminal activity may be afoot[,]” the officer could conduct
a forcible limited detention.127 The Court used a similar concern about
crime and officer safety to justify another watering down of the Fourth
Amendment: if the officer also had reasonable suspicion that a person
was armed or dangerous, the officer could add a pat down for
weapons—in other words, a stop and frisk.128
Importantly, in deciding Terry as it did, the Court explicitly
recognized that stop-and-frisk practices were not race neutral and that
its Terry decision was likely to have a disproportionate impact on racial
minorities.129 Indeed, the reason the officer focused on Terry and his
companion and concluded that “they just didn’t look right to me at the
time”130 likely had much to do with race.131 However, this was a trade off
the Court was willing to make. In weighing the needs of the police on
one side and the privacy interests of racial minorities and goal of raceblind policing on the other, the Court came down on the side of the
police. Indeed, lest there be any doubt that there was a police exception
to the notion that the state should be color blind, the Court clarified this
point a few years later: the police may consider race and ethnicity in

126. In emphasizing reasonableness, the Court engaged in doctrinal drift, allowing a
reasonableness approach that it had just adopted in the administrative search context in
Camara, 387 U.S. 523, to find a home in the law enforcement context. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
As Joshua Dressler and Alan Michaels have written of this adoption, “[i]f Camara cracked the
Fourth Amendment monolith, Terry v. Ohio broke it entirely.” See 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER &
ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 17.01, at 277–79 (4th ed.
2006).
127. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
128. Id. at 27.
129. See id. at 14 n.11. The Court noted:
While the frequency with which “frisking” forms a part of field interrogation practice
varies tremendously with the locale, the objective of the interrogation, and the
particular officer it cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor in policecommunity tensions. This is particularly true in situations where the “stop and frisk”
of youths or minority group members is “motivated by the officers’ perceived need to
maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by
humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets.”
Id. (quoting LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY, DONALD M. MCINTYRE, JR. & DANIEL L.
ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 47–48 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1967).
130. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67), 1967 WL 93600, at
*6.
131. That race likely played a role in the stop in Terry has not been lost on other
commentators. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal
Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1574 (2011) (noting that “it is not unreasonable to
conclude Officer[] McFadden’s comments were racially inflected”). See generally Thompson,
supra note 120 (providing an overview of the use of race under the Terry standard).
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deciding whom to stop during border stops.132 Many lower courts have
interpreted this case to permit the use of race as a factor in stop-andfrisk decisions.133
Equally important, in embracing a standard far weaker than
probable cause, and one that only need be articulated ex post, the Court
implicitly sanctioned a category that is “so malleable that reasonable
suspicion is often reconfigured into whatever a law enforcement officer
wants it to be at any given moment.”134 This weak standard has been a
windfall to law enforcement officers, who can and do categorize almost
anything as suspicious. Justice Thurgood Marshall observed as much
when he noted that the Drug Enforcement Administration’s drug
courier profile could apply to almost anyone agents wanted to stop
without discrimination based on the type of ticket the passenger had
purchased, the amount of luggage the passenger carried, where the
passenger was seated on the plane, or how the passenger behaved.135
There is one further problem with Terry that scholars have only
recently begun to analyze. In creating an articulable reasonable
suspicion standard,136 the Court failed to foresee that its malleable
standard would result not only in individual stops and frisks that could
be separately analyzed for their constitutionality but also the wholesale

132. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563–64 (1976) (allowing race as a
permissible factor in conducting border stops); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
886–87 (1975) (also allowing race as a permissible factor in conducting border stops).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Pena-Cantu, 639 F.2d 1228, 1228–29 (5th Cir. 1981)
(discussing how officers stopped vehicles containing entirely adult male Hispanics); United
States v. Hernandez-Lopez, 538 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing how an officer
stopped a driver because he was dressed “like a Mexican cowboy”); United States v. Travis,
837 F. Supp. 1386, 1391 (E.D. Ky. 1993) (discussing how officers believed that focusing on
minorities was an effective use of law enforcement resources). For a discussion of lower courts
permitting the use of race as a factor in stop-and-frisk decisions, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race
and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 232–33 (1983); L. Song Richardson,
Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2068–69 (2011); Randall
S. Susskind, Note, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
324, 336–38 (1994). For a sampling of cases allowing the use of racial incongruity as a factor in
determining reasonable suspicion, see Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, supra note 17, at 66
n.148.
134. Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, supra note 17, at 860.
135. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing
over a dozen federal cases that fit the DEA’s broad drug courier profile, including instances
where “suspect was first to deplane[,]” the “last to deplane[,]” or “deplaned from the middle”;
where suspects had “one-way tickets[,]” “round-trip tickets[,]” “non-stop flights[,]” or
“changed planes”; suspects with “no luggage” or “new suitcases”; suspects who were
“traveling alone” or “traveling with [a] companion”; and suspects who “acted nervously” or
“acted calmly”).
136. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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use of such tactics across entire communities.137 It is the systemic use of
stops and frisks that are the problem du jour. What was really at issue in
New York City, for example, was not so much the constitutionality of
individual stops, or stops at the retail level. Rather, the problem was an
entire program, referred to as New York’s aggressive stop-and-frisk
policy, instituted as a top-down approach and supported by then-Mayor
Michael Bloomberg and then-Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly.138
As Tracy Meares observes, these are “programmatic stops . . . imposed
from the top down” on a massive scale.139 Terry, as a case, is still
inadequate for addressing this problem. And this is to say nothing of
inefficiency of stop and frisk as a police tactic140 or evidence that stopand-frisk policing could even contribute to an increase in law breaking
rather than a diminution.141
Terry, however, was not the Court’s only decision to contribute to
racialized policing and sacrifice the privacy interests of racial minorities.
Equally detrimental was its decision in Whren v. United States.142 Faced
137. See Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of
Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 162 (2015).
138. See Michael Bloomberg, ‘Stop and Frisk’ Keeps New York Safe, WASH. POST (Aug.
18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-bloomberg-stop-and-friskkeeps-new-york-safe/2013/08/18/8d4cd8c4-06cf-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html?utm_term
=.ea89ff51f6e9 [https://perma.cc/KR5K-NKQ7]; Jessica Chasmar, NYPD Commissioner
Raymond Kelly Defends ‘Essential’ Stop-and-Frisk, WASH. TIMES (July 23, 2013), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/23/nypd-commissioner-raymond-kelly-defends-essential-/
[https://perma.cc/ZZ9V-JVQN].
139. Meares, supra note 137, at 162.
140. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop-andFrisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at
15), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2845540 [https://perma.cc/WH9SGBEX (staff-uploaded archive)] (reviewing studies and concluding that the “empirical case
for a crime-control benefit from [stop-and-frisk practices] . . . does not stand on strong
foundations”).
141. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics,
Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1282 (2004) (observing that “racial profiling on the highways may well
increase the amount of profiled crime and costs associated with police searches, resulting in
numerically more white motorists offending because of a perceived sense of immunity”); see
also K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 271 (2009)
(demonstrating that aggressive policing could ultimately be criminogenic in part because of
legitimacy failures and that victims of profiling will perceive the system as illegitimate and feel
less obligated to obey the law). For a discussion of how aggressive policing in general can
increase crime, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at
a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. &
CRIMINOLOGY 335, 338 (2011) (“[T]he local policing practices currently favored in much of
America not only have hidden costs for effective crime prevention but also can directly
undermine sound responses to the threat of terrorism.”).
142. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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with a case in which vice-squad officers observed two black men in a
Pathfinder, decided to follow them, and pulled them over after
observing them turn without signaling, the Court held that it was
irrelevant whether the police stopped the vehicle on a pretext.143 Writing
for the entire Court, Justice Scalia concluded that the subjective
motivations of the officers, even if race based,144 are irrelevant under the
Fourth Amendment.145 Rather, so long as the traffic stop itself is based
on a traffic violation, such stops will be permissible.146 In doing so, the
Court gave another windfall to law enforcement officers and dealt
another blow to the notion of race-free policing.147 Indeed, the law
enforcement community quickly hailed Whren as a victory and adopted
police tactics to maximize the decision’s impact.148 The police training
manual, Tactics for Criminal Patrol, reflects this adoption.149 In its
“Criminal Patrol Pyramid,” the manual instructs officers to do the
following:
1.
2.
3.

Develop suspicion (or, typically, merely curiosity) about a
driver.
Discover a legal justification to stop the driver (typically this
justification is some minor violation of the traffic laws or
vehicle code), and make the stop.
Decide, after making the stop, whether to seek to search the
vehicle based on the close observation of the vehicle and its

143. See id. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.”).
144. The Court suggested that racial animus or discrimination, irrelevant to a Fourth
Amendment claim, might be relevant to a claim based on the equal protection clause. Id.
However, given the hurdles the Court has erected to frustrate equal protection claims,
including a discovery hurdle erected the same term as Whren, this alternative route is
practically impassable. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468–71 (1996) (requiring
that defendants seeking discovery to show a pattern of racial discrimination first provide
actual evidence consistent with race-based decision making); Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine
Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1860–61 (2004).
145. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
146. See id. at 810.
147. See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 340
(1998).
148. See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD HAIDERMARKEL, PULLED OVER 35 (2014). Law enforcement responded to Whren with increased
enrollments in training to use profiles in connection with pretext stops; one California
highway patrol training officer was quoted as saying, “After Whren the game was over. We
won.” Id.; see also Carbado, supra note 18 (manuscript at 155–56); Kenneth Gavsie, Note,
Making the Best of “Whren”: The Problems with Pretextual Traffic Stops and the Need for
Restraint, 50 FLA. L. REV. 385, 394 (1998) (positing that “law enforcement has taken full
advantage of the Court's liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Whren”).
149. See CHARLES REMSBERG, TACTICS FOR CRIMINAL PATROL: VEHICLE STOPS,
DRUG DISCOVERY AND OFFICER SURVIVAL 9 (1995).
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visible contents and dialogue with the driver (and
passengers). Officers use this dialogue to assess the
truthfulness of the driver.
Search the vehicle (“usually by consent”).
Discover contraband and weapons.
Make an arrest.
Seek “bonus benefits” (forfeiture of vehicles, cash, etc.;
information about additional criminal offenses).150

There is a final case worth mentioning that normalized and gave
legitimacy to racialized policing. That case is United States v.
Mendenhall,151 which introduced the Court’s “free to leave” test.152
Faced with the question of whether the police stop of Sylvia
Mendenhall, a young woman disembarking from a flight at the Detroit
Metropolitan Airport, was an unconstitutional stop because the police
lacked either probable cause or even reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, Justice Stewart ruled that the Fourth Amendment was simply
inapplicable.153 Creating the fiction154 that a reasonable person would
have felt “free to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on
her way,”155 Justice Stewart wrote that the Fourth Amendment was not
implicated at all, since as a matter of law there was never a seizure.156 It
was no excuse that the police officer never advised Sylvia Mendenhall,
whom the Court described as “a female and a Negro,”157 that she was
free to leave.158 The putative reasonable person, apparently civic-

150. See id. at 9.
151. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
152. See id. at 554.
153. See id. at 555.
154. See Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The
Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine,
38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 521–22 (2001) (describing the “free to leave” test as involving a
legal fiction since few individuals would in fact feel free to leave when accosted by a police
officer); cf. Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion,
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 153 (describing the “free to leave” test). Alice Ristroph adds that, in
viewing such encounters as consensual, courts tend to ignore the unstated power of the
officers’ position as an agent of the state. See Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A
Counter-Narrative to Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1611–16
(2015). This position tips the balance of power, rendering fictional the notion that most
individuals feel on equal footing such to refuse a request. See id.
155. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555.
156. See id. at 558.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 555 (“Our conclusion that no seizure occurred is not affected by the fact that
the respondent was not expressly told by the agents that she was free to decline to cooperate
with their inquiry, for the voluntariness of her responses does not depend upon her having
been so informed.”). Although the Court acknowledged that the encounter might “reasonably
have appeared coercive to the respondent, who was 22 years old and had not been graduated
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educated and schooled in the Fourth Amendment, would simply know
this. The Court extended and broadened this “free to leave” test in
subsequent cases such as Florida v. Bostick,159 United States v. Drayton,160
and INS v. Delgado.161 As a result, many police stops and the
accompanying questions—“Where are you going?” “Do you live
nearby?” “Are you visiting someone here?” “Can I see some
identification?”—are no longer categorized as stops regulated by the
Fourth Amendment at all but rather are deemed consensual
encounters.162 Consider what this means. In the context of stop-and-frisk
data, for example, the data tell us virtually nothing about the number of

from high school[,]” id. at 558, the Court’s subsequent decisions have de-emphasized, or
ignored entirely, similar characteristics. For example, in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
(1991), in which the Court intimated that a youth on a bus was “free to leave” when
confronted by an officer, id. at 432, the majority made no mention of Bostick’s race at all. One
has to read the dissent to find any indication that Bostick was black. See id. at 441 n.1
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), the Court concluded that
when between twenty and thirty federal agents entered a factory and conducted a sweep to
check the immigration status of factory workers, the workers were free to leave
notwithstanding that the agents were armed, carried handcuffs, and manned the exits. Id. at
212–13. At no point does the Court address the role that ethnicity, class, or even immigration
status might have played in whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. Joshua
Dressler and Alan C. Michaels’ observation about the race language in Mendenhall is
revealing. Dressler and Michaels note that ultimately the Justices “concluded that the racial
aspects of the case were not determinative, and the Court has never found them so in the
quarter century since.” DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 126, at § 7.03(C)(3), at 116.
159. 501 US. 429, 435–37 (1991) (suggesting that youth who was confronted by two
sheriff’s deputies who boarded a bus to question passengers was not seized since a reasonable
person would have felt free “to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter”).
160. 536 U.S. 194, 197–98, 207 (2002) (noting that bus passenger who was questioned when
three officers entered a bus—one remaining near the exit while a second stood at the back of
the bus—was not seized since a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or terminate
the encounter).
161. 466 U.S. 210, 212–13, 218 (1984) (discussing how factory workers were not seized
even though several federal agents entered factory, blocked exits, and conducted an
immigration sweep, since the factory workers were not seized since a reasonable person would
have felt free to discontinue contact with the federal agents).
162. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (stating that officer’s continued
questioning of driver after issuing a warning deemed a consensual encounter and thus did not
require legal justification). As Devon Carbado recently observed, it matters little that actual
reasonable people would not feel free to leave or that they could terminate the encounter:
“[T]he free-to-leave framework is a normative inquiry rhetorically disguised as an empirical
one.” Carbado, supra note 18 (manuscript at 118). The test becomes even more problematic
when race and class are added to the equation. Cynthia Lee has been even more blunt in
stating “[a] young black male who has grown up in South Central Los Angeles knows that if
he is stopped by a police officer, he should do whatever the officer says and not talk back
unless he wants to kiss the ground.” Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1152 (2012).
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individuals who were deemed consensually encountered.163 And once
again, since officers do not need probable cause or even reasonable
suspicion, the brunt of such encounters is disproportionately
experienced by racial minorities, who are often deemed “always
already” criminal.164
None of this is to say that the Court’s role in subordinating the goal
of equality before the law to law enforcement objectives always goes
unacknowledged. Consider Justice Stevens’s candid dissent in California
v. Acevedo,165 a case essentially reaffirming the authority of police
officers to search cars without a warrant:166
In the years [from 1982 to 1991], the Court has heard argument in
30 Fourth Amendment cases involving narcotics. In all but one,
the government was the petitioner. All save two involved a search
or seizure without a warrant or with a defective warrant. And, in
all except three, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
search or seizure.
In the meantime, the flow of narcotics cases through the courts
has steadily and dramatically increased. No impartial observer
could criticize this Court for hindering the progress of the war on
drugs. On the contrary, decisions like the one the Court makes

163. For example, officers with the City of New York Police Department are required to
document “forcible” stops for data-collection purposes, but there is no requirement that they
document consensual encounters. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., STOP AND FRISK
REPORT 63 (2003), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp
_frsk.pdf [https://perma.cc/55VP-EFG4]; see also Ristroph, supra note 82 (manuscript at 16
n.57) (noting that many jurisdictions “do not track stops, let alone . . . near-seizures,”
Ristroph’s term for consensual encounters); Police Practices and Civil Rights in New York
City, Chapter 5: Stop, Question, and Frisk, U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS (Aug. 2000), http://
www.usccr.gov/pubs/nypolice/ch5.htm [https://perma.cc/MR3R-D4FJ] (“Accordingly, if a
person is stopped and questioned without official use of force and gives his or her name, a
UF-250 is not required, provided that the individual is neither frisked nor arrested by NYPD
officers.”).
164. For a discussion of what it means to be “always already” criminal, see Frank Rudy
Cooper, We Are Always Already Imprisoned: Hyper-Incarceration and Black Male Identity
Performance, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1185, 1187–88 (2013) (discussing disparities in policing of men
of color and stating that “[t]he mainstream’s depiction of black men as always already
imprisoned disciplines us into the never-finished quest to prove we are a ‘Good Black Man,’
rather than a ‘Bad Black Man’ ”). See also LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY 85, 119 (2001) (“[I]deology has always-already
interpellated individuals as subjects, . . . Hence individuals are ‘abstract’ with respect to the
subjects which they always-already are.”).
165. 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that police can search a container within a car if they
have probable cause to believe that container holds evidence of a crime).
166. See id. at 573.

95 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2017)

1268

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

today will support the conclusion that this Court has become a
loyal foot soldier in the Executive’s fight against crime.167
Such honesty and transparency, however, are rare. More often, the
Court’s role in facilitating unequal and racialized policing goes
unnoticed and unremarked upon.
To be sure, there are many more cases that reflect the Court’s
juridical subordination of equality goals. In the end though, everything,
including Whren and Mendenhall, is traceable to Terry. Terry, after all, is
the case in which the Court most significantly began its shift from a
warrant-centric view of the Fourth Amendment to a reasonablenesscentric view.168 More importantly, it is the case in which the Warren
Court, long viewed as a champion of defendant rights,169 first began to
sacrifice those individual rights, including the right to equal treatment
before the law, in favor of the interests of law enforcement and crime
control.170 As I wrote some years ago, “[I]f the Fourth Amendment itself
has a poisonous tree, its name is Terry v. Ohio.”171
II. RACE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE WAY WE COULD POLICE
TOMORROW
The racialized policing problems discussed above—police violence,
underenforcement, and racial profiling—are not unsolvable. However,
given the Court’s role in enabling the state of affairs we are in, the
solution I am proposing has little to do with seeking recourse through
courts. Instead, it has everything to do with technology, specifically with
harnessing technology in ways that can deracialize policing. Though I
will return to the problems of police violence and underenforcement, I
begin below with technology that can combat racial profiling. The cost,
again, is that there will be more policing, not less. The cost, too, is that
167. Id. at 600–01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
168. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.01, at 291–
93 (3d ed. 2002).
169. See A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV.
249, 254 (1968). As described by Earl Dudley, the law clerk who worked for Chief Justice
Warren on Terry v. Ohio, external factors played a significant role in the outcome of the case.
See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law
Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 892–93 (1998). Not only was there civil unrest
in many cities, but in addition, the Court had been a target during the 1964 presidential
campaign for defending individual rights at the expense of law enforcement and was expected
to become a target again in the 1968 campaign. Id. For more on the attacks against the Court
at the time, see FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 8–15 (1970).
170. For a contrary view, see Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in
Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (arguing that the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure cases were not marked by egalitarianism).
171. Capers, supra note 9, at 32.
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many Americans will have to surrender some of the privacy they now
enjoy. The technology I have in mind might rile civil libertarians and
progressives, and even some black folk. But again, hear me out. Allow
me to again channel Ralph Ellison’s nameless narrator: “[b]ear with
me.”172
I mentioned earlier that the police in New York City recorded 4.4
million forcible stops between 2004 and 2012, and that over eighty-three
percent of those stopped were either black or brown, a number far
greater than their representation in the population.173 But these numbers
tell only part of the story. As statistician and criminologist Jeffrey Fagan
noted, the percentage of black and brown people stopped is high even
after accounting for crime rates.174 Other numbers speak to what I have
termed “Terry innocen[ce.]”175 For every twenty individuals stopped, a
full nineteen were found not to be engaged in activity warranting an
arrest.176 In other words, the error rate was around ninety-five percent.
And even this understates the true error rate, since research has shown
that nearly half of all arrests resulting from these stop-and-frisk
encounters do not result in a conviction.177 The error rate rises even
more, spectacularly more, when one considers the oft-stated objective of
aggressive stop-and-frisk practices: to get illegal firearms out of the
hands of criminals.178 According to the NYPD’s own data, officers find
one firearm for every 1,000 stops, which translates into an error rate of
over 99.9%.179 To put this in perspective, this result is on par with the
172. See ELLISON, supra note 10, at 12.
173. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see supra
note 86 and accompanying text.
174. See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 3, Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (No. 08-CV01034), http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Expert_Report_JeffreyFagan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6TWL-4NZ3].
175. I use the term “Terry innocent” to describe the individuals who are not found to be
engaged in criminal activity warranting an arrest. Capers, Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal
Assists, supra note 17 (manuscript at 32 n.163).
176. Cf. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. at 558 (concluding that only around six percent of all forcible
stops resulted in an arrest). It is possible that even Justice Scalia would have found this
accuracy rate unacceptable. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1695 (2014) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that a hit rate of less than five percent, or one in twenty, would be
insufficient to justify reasonable suspicion).
177. See ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., A REPORT
ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP-ANDFRISK PRACTICES 3, 10 fig.7 (Nov. 2013), https://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT
_ON_SQF_PRACTICES_NOV_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HEE-LMNE].
178. RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI & WILLIAM J. BRATTON, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 1:
GETTING GUNS OFF THE STREETS OF NEW YORK 3 (1994); Barry Paddock, Kelly: Stop-andFrisk Saves Lives, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york
/kelly-stop-and-frisk-saves-lives-article-1.1306828 [https://perma.cc/T3RX-ECRJ].
179. Paddock, supra note 178.
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success rate for when officers engage in purely random searches.180
Moreover, evidence suggests that racialized policing, rather than
contributing to accuracy, adds to error. In New York, for example,
stopped blacks were actually less likely to have a weapon than stopped
whites.181 In Maryland, the “hit rate” was also lower for searched blacks
than for searched whites.182 Similar results come from New Jersey, where
troopers found evidence of criminal activity in 13% of their searches of
black motorists compared to in 25% of their searches of white
motorists.183
The foregoing suggests more than merely a racialized policing
problem in which “[s]kin color becomes evidence[.]”184 It points to more
than what social scientists have long confirmed: that we all suffer from
biases, and many of those biases are about race and criminality.185 It
suggests more than simply the fact that stop-and-frisk practices have a
breadth that disproportionately affects those who are Terry innocent. It
suggests a fundamental flaw with the way we police now, a flaw that
undermines, with every racially inflected look, encounter, stop, or frisk,
our protestations that we are all equal before the law. Instead of a colorblind government, it suggests a color-dependent government. It is
certainly at odds with Chief Justice Roberts’ insistence that “[t]he way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.”186
In critical race theory, it is not uncommon to invoke the trope of
using the master’s tools “to dismantle the master’s house[.]”187 Here, I
180. See Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D at 35, Floyd v. City of New
York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08-CV-01034), http://ccrjustice.org/sites
/default/files/assets/files/FaganSecondSupplementalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNA3P5AQ].
181. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 661 n.760.
182. See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE 80 (2002).
183. Id.
184. Harris, supra note 83, at 268.
185. See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004) (describing how study
participants classified positive words faster after seeing the word “White” than after seeing
the word “Black”); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual
Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 881 (2004) (noting that participants
who saw a black face were quicker to identify “crime-relevant objects” than those who saw
none); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1508–14 (2005)
(summarizing studies that measure bias in racial meanings); Richardson, supra note 133, at
2036 (“The science of implicit social cognition . . . can contribute much to the understanding of
police behavior, especially as it relates to the treatment of nonwhites.”).
186. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
187. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially-Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 680 (1995) (“Through jury nullification, I want to dismantle
the master’s house with the master’s tools.”). Interestingly, the source of the trope posited the
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have little interest in the tools of law, especially since those tools are
ultimately in the control of a Court that routinely subordinates the
interests of those who are black and brown to the interests of those who
are not. But I am interested in another tool: technology. Specifically, I
am interested in the way technology can deracialize and de-bias policing.
I am interested in the way technology can say to those who claim that
racial biases are inevitable in policing, “Think again.” I am interested in
technology that will lay bare not only the truth of how we police now but
also how those of us who are black or brown live now.
What I am advocating for first are more public surveillance
cameras. I say more because already there are many.188 Public
surveillance cameras are already integral to law enforcement. For
example, New York City aggregates and analyzes data from
approximately 3,000 surveillance cameras around the city and allows the
police to scan license plates, cross-check criminal databases, measure
radiation levels, “and more[.]”189 Washington, D.C., is in the process of
consolidating over 5,000 cameras into one network called the Video
Interoperability for Public Safety.190 Chicago, with at least 2,250
surveillance cameras, has Operation Virtual Shield, which includes
biometric technology.191 Baltimore has CitiWatch, which includes over
400 cameras equipped with low light, pan, tilt, and zoom capabilities.192

opposite, that the master’s tools can never destroy the master’s house. See AUDRE LORDE,
The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 110, 110–
12 (1984).
188. See Steve Henn, In More Cities, a Camera on Every Corner, Park and Sidewalk, NPR
(June 20, 2013, 2:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/06/20/191603369
/The-Business-Of-Surveillance-Cameras [https://perma.cc/A29W-PLCL].
189. See Joe Coscarelli, The NYPD’s Domain Awareness System Is Watching You, N.Y.
MAG.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 9, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer
/2012/08/nypd-domain-awareness-system-microsoft-is-watching-you.html [https://perma.cc
/CQ83-BEXK]; Rocco Parascandola & Tina Moore, NYPD Unveils New $40 Million Super
Computer System That Uses Data from Network of Cameras, License Plate Readers and Crime
Reports, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 8:50 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypdunveils-new-40-million-super-computer-system-data-network-cameras-license-plate-readerscrime-reports-article-1.1132135 [https://perma.cc/P3EB-A4XW].
190. D.C. Police Set to Monitor 5000 Cameras, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/apr/9/dc-police-set-to-monitor-5000-cameras/ [https://perma
.cc/D7F9-PFCM].
191. BILGE YESIL, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: POWER AND PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 38
(2009). Biometric technology uses physical and behavioral features to identify and monitor
individuals. See Definition of Biometrics, BIOMETRICS INST. (2017), http://www
.biometricsinstitute.org/pages/definition-of-biometrics.html [https://perma.cc/D5PK-BQYL].
Examples include the use of retina scans, voice recognition, and surveillance cameras that
identify an individual by his gait. See Types of Biometrics, BIOMETRICS INST. (2017), http://
www.biometricsinstitute.org/pages/types-of-biometrics.html [https://perma.cc/4BLQ-857W].
192. YESIL, supra note 191, at 35.
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Finally, consider this description of the Real Time Crime Center in
Fresno, California:
On 57 monitors that cover the walls of the center, operators
zoomed and panned an array of roughly 200 police cameras
perched across the city. They could dial up 800 more feeds from
the city’s schools and traffic cameras, and they soon hope to add
400 more streams from cameras worn on officers’ bodies and from
thousands of local businesses that have surveillance systems.193
Even small towns have turned to surveillance cameras. A survey
from just over a decade ago listed over 200 towns in thirty-seven states
that were either using or planning to use public surveillance cameras.194
But for the most part, these cameras tend to be clustered in communities
that are poor, black and brown,195 or at the opposite extreme, areas that

193. Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat
‘Score’, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/thenew-way-police-are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e1511e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html [https://perma.cc/DR3A-2DAX].
194. See Lisa Hoffman, Under Surveillance: Government Spy Cameras Proliferate, PRISON
PLANET (June 22, 2006), http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/june2006/230606Surveillance
.htm [https://perma.cc/GBK4-8GNR] (“A Scripps Howard News Service tally found that at
least 200 towns and cities in 37 states now employ video cameras—or are in the process of
doing so—to watch sidewalks, parks, schools, buses, buildings and similar community
locales.”); see also Matt Cagle, Communities Under Surveillance, ACLU N. CAL. (Nov. 21,
2014), https://www.aclunc.org/blog/communities-under-surveillance-california [https://perma
.cc/HA9G-NPZR] (noting that “surveillance technology is frequently and disproportionately
used on minority communities without their knowledge or consent”); N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, WHO’S WATCHING? VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE IN NEW YORK CITY AND THE
NEED FOR PUBLIC OVERSIGHT 5, 10 (2006), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files
/publications/nyclu_pub_whos_watching.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6Q8-G3SG] (noting that
surveillance cameras are used in a manner that targets people based on race and that 3,100
surveillance cameras operated by the NYPD’s VIPER unit are focused on communities of
color); Charlie Savage, US Doles Out Millions for Street Cameras, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 12,
2007), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/08/12/us_doles_out_millions
_for_street_cameras/ [https://perma.cc/WNU6-TB6F] (“The Department of Homeland Security
is funneling millions of dollars to local governments nationwide for purchasing high-tech
video camera networks . . . .”).
195. See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 194, at 10; see also Cameras Installed at
Bridgeport Public Housing, NEWS 12 CONN. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://connecticut.news12.com
/news/security-cameras-installed-at-bridgeport-public-housing-complexes-1.11610221 [https://
perma.cc/S29E-FTNP]; Megan Cottrell, Will 3,000 Cameras Make Chicago’s Public Housing
Safer, CHICAGONOW: ONE STORY UP (July 20, 2009, 7:55 AM), http://www.chicagonow.com
/blogs/one-story-up/2009/07/will-3000-cameras-make-chicagos-public-housing-safer.html [https://
perma.cc/4E47-PUH5]; Alice Speri, Newark Public Housing Installs Surveillance Cameras as
Part of Massive Security Initiative, N.J.COM (Aug. 21, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://www.nj.com
/news/index.ssf/2011/08/newark_public_housing_boosts_s.html
[https://perma.cc/C6QCCV5U]. This contemporary racialized surveillance has prompted cultural scholar John Fiske
to remark that “today’s seeing eye is white[.]” John Fiske, Surveilling the City: Whiteness, the
Black Man and Democratic Totalitarianism, 15 THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y 67, 69 (1998).
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are rich and that the state wants to protect from an entirely different
group of brown folk. By this, I mean that cameras are most prevalent in
areas around public housing projects and around potential terrorist
targets such as the New York Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board of
Trade, Times Square, and Washington, D.C.196 But cameras should not
be limited to these areas. Cameras, like CCTV in Britain,197 should be
extended to virtually all public spaces. If we are going to watch some
people, then all of us should be watched.
Along with public surveillance cameras, law enforcement should
add facial recognition technology, which is already in use by over fifty
police departments198 and is at the center of the FBI’s Next Generation
Identification Project, which has been “creating a trove of fingerprints,
iris scans, data from facial recognition software and other sources.”199
The technology should not only be limited to comparing faces to
available arrest photos but also to driver’s license photos and photos on
social media sites like Facebook and Instagram. And law enforcement
should add access to “Big Data”200 to the equation. Already the
196. See, e.g., Chicago Expands Surveillance Cameras Network, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug.
15, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/15/chicago-expands-surveilla_n_877681
.html [https://perma.cc/FJG3-GM92] (surveillance at the Chicago Board of Trade); Suzanne
Choney, Lawmakers Want More Surveillance on the Ground—and in the Sky, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 20, 2013), https://usnews.newsvine.com/_news/2013/04/20/17830619-lawmakers-wantmore-surveillance-on-the-ground-and-in-the-sky [https://perma.cc/P6TY-KV3P] (surveillance
in Washington, D.C.); Chris Francescani, NYPD Expands Surveillance Network to Fight
Crime as Well as Terrorism, REUTERS (June 21, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-nysurveillance-idUSL2N0EV0D220130621 [https://perma.cc/64XK-MUMT] (surveillance at the
New York Stock Exchange).
197. David Barrett, One Surveillance Camera for Every 11 People in Britain, Says CCTV
Survey, TELEGRAPH (July 10, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology
/10172298/One-surveillance-camera-for-every-11-people-in-Britain-says-CCTV-survey.html
[https://perma.cc/HH7M-XFRP].
198. Sabrina A. Lochner, Note, Saving Face: Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Mobile
Facial Recognition Technology & Iris Scans, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 202 (2013).
199. Jouvenal, supra note 193.
200. Defining “Big Data” is notoriously difficult. The technical definition usually
constrains Big Data to “[w]here the data volume, acquisition velocity, or data representation
limits the ability to perform effective analysis using traditional relational approaches or
requires the use of significant horizontal scaling for efficient processing.” Frank Konkel,
Sketching the Big Picture on Big Data, FCW (Apr. 15, 2013), http://fcw.com/articles/2013/04/15
/big-experts-on-big-data.aspx?m=1 [https://perma.cc/VUJ4-DABJ]; see also Big Data: What It
Is and Why It Matters, SAS, http://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/big-data/what-is-big-data.html
[https://perma.cc/2PVJ-A2MT] (“The concept gained momentum in the early 2000s when
industry analyst Doug Laney articulated the now-mainstream definition of big data as the
three Vs: Volume[,] . . . Velocity[,] . . . [and] Variety.”). More recently, scholars have turned to
thinking of Big Data as a social phenomenon rather than merely a technical one. See, e.g., Neil
M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 394 (2014)
(“We prefer to define big data and big data analytics socially, rather than technically, in terms
of the broader societal impact . . . .”). The definition offered in a recent book on Big Data is

95 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2017)

1274

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

information available (from credit card transactions to credit history,
from Facebook likes to Twitter feeds, from favorite bands to favored
political candidates) is vast. Consider a report from just a few years ago:
[I]n 2013 the amount of stored information in the world is
estimated to be about 1,200 exabytes, of which less than 2 percent
is non-digital.
There is no way to think about what this size of data means. If it
were all printed in books, they would cover the entire surface of
the United States some 52 layers thick. If it were played on CDROMS, and stacked up, they would stretch to the moon in five
separate piles.201
Indeed, merely from Facebook alone, which is used by nearly two
billion people, the accessible information is significant.202 As the
Washington Post recently reported, Facebook collects ninety-eight data
points on each of its users.203 As the writer Sue Halpern put it,
[a]mong this ninety-eight are ethnicity, income, net worth, home
value, if you are a mom, if you are a soccer mom, if you are
married, the number of lines of credit you have, if you are
interested in Ramadan, when you bought your car, and on and on
and on.204
Elizabeth Joh adds, “[S]oon it will be feasible and affordable for the
government to record, store, and analyze nearly everything people
do.”205 Quite simply, whether it involves tracking location history by
remotely accessing and analyzing metadata on our phones (including the
data that “radiate[s]” from our phones and other smart devices),206 or
perhaps useful. It defines Big Data as referring “to things one can do at a large scale that
cannot be done at a smaller one, to extract new insights or create new forms of value, in ways
that change markets, organizations, the relationship between citizens and governments, and
more.” VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6 (2013).
201. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 200, at 9.
202. Caitlin Dewey, 98 Personal Data Points That Facebook Uses to Target Ads to You,
WASH. POST: INTERSECT (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect
/wp/2016/08/19/98-personal-data-points-that-facebook-uses-to-target-ads-to-you/?utm_term
=.c78ea3701b02 [https://perma.cc/4RH7-6UH9].
203. Id.
204. Sue Halpern, They Have, Right Now, Another You, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, (Dec. 22,
2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/12/22/they-have-right-now-another-you/ [https://
perma.cc/77RY-23SZ].
205. Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data,
and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 15–16 (2016).
206. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1, 61–63), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
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accessing surveillance camera data (both public and private), or turning
to commercial data aggregators, we should give the police technological
tools so that, with a click of a button, “unknown suspects can be
known[.]”207 Police departments are already purchasing swaths of
information about citizens from data analysis firms.208
Finally, police should be equipped with terahertz scanners. Recall
that one goal of stop-and-frisk practices is to get firearms out of the
hands of criminals,209 a goal which has led to the targeting of those of us
who are black or brown.210 In fact, terahertz scanners, which measure
terahertz radiation, can scan for concealed weapons without the need for
a stop or frisk.211 The device is small enough to be placed in a police
vehicle or even mounted like a surveillance camera.212 As the New York
City Police Commissioner put it during a public announcement,
[t]he device reads a specific form of natural energy emitted by
people and objects known as terahertz. If something is obstructing
the flow of that radiation, for example a weapon, the device will
highlight that object. Over the past twelve months, we’ve been
working with the vendor and the London Metropolitan Police to
develop a tool that meets our requirements. We took delivery of it
last week.
One of our requirements was that the technology must be
portable . . . we’re able to mount it in a truck.213
_id=2752788 [https://perma.cc/HJ5A-SCXZ (staff-uploaded archive)] (discussing such data
and arguing for an “informational curtilage” framework for addressing Fourth Amendment
concerns).
207. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U.
PENN. L. REV. 327, 351 (2015). One can imagine access to data being limited to nonintimate
information. For a discussion of this possibility, see generally Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs,
and the Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691 (2014) (arguing that data mining poses a
threat to traditional notions of privacy).
208. Darwin Bond-Graham & Ali Winston, Forget the NSA, the LAPD Spies on Millions
of Innocent Folks, L.A. WEEKLY (Feb. 27, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news
/forget-the-nsa-the-lapd-spies-on-millions-of-innocent-folks-4473467 [https://perma.cc/95X25TCT]; Halpern, supra note 204; Quentin Hardy, The Risk to Civil Liberties of Fighting Crime
with Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/technology/therisk-to-civil-liberties-of-fighting-crime-with-big-data.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8BU8-5A3T].
209. GIULIANI & BRATTON, supra note 178, at 3.
210. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding
that police had a policy and practice of targeting black and Hispanic men for forcible stops, in
violation of the equal protection clause).
211. See John Del Signore, NYPD “Takes Delivery” of Portable Body Scanners to Detect
Concealed Weapons on the Street, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 23, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://gothamist.com
/2013/01/23/nypd_takes_delivery_of_van-mounted.php [https://perma.cc/S95N-HG8L].
212. Id.
213. Id. Assuming the device could only reveal the presence of a concealed weapon, using
the device would not constitute a Fourth Amendment search under current precedent. See
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To be clear, all of this might sound precariously close to George
Orwell’s “Big Brother[.]”214 But such technology can also deracialize
policing. After all, cameras and terahertz scanners do not have implicit
biases.215 Nor do they suffer from unconscious racism.216 Rather,

generally United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (treating searches that can only
reveal the presence or absence of contraband as nonsearches under the Fourth Amendment);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (treating searches that can only reveal the
presence or absence of contraband as nonsearches). This should be true even where one is
licensed to carry a firearm, at least in areas where having a license is uncommon, just as
canine sniffs for narcotics are nonsearches, Place, 462 U.S. at 707, even where one, say, has a
medical marijuana license. But see Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2015) (arguing that, given expanding protections of the Second Amendment,
possession of a handgun without more could be inadequate to justify a Fourth Amendment
stop).
214. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 2 (Secker & Warburg 1999) (1949). The specter of
“Big Brother” has not escaped the Court. In Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1988), a case
holding that helicopter surveillance of an individual’s back yard was not a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Brennan quoted a passage from 1984 in his
dissent:
The black-mustachio’d face gazed down from every commanding corner. There was
one on the house front immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the
caption said . . . . In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs,
hovered for an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving flight. It
was the Police Patrol, snooping into people’s windows.
Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting ORWELL, supra, at 2). For an interesting
discussion of the Big Brother metaphor, see Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1413–19 (2001).
215. Of course, algorithms are only as reliable as the inputs and can reflect the biases of
their programmers. See Claire Cain Miller, When Algorithms Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES: THE
UPSHOT (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/when-algorithmsdiscriminate.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=Moth-Visible&module=insidenyt-region&region=inside-nyt-region&WT.nav=inside-nyt-region&_r=1&abt=0002&abg=1
[https://perma.cc/83EZ-RPWX]. Sociologist Gary Marx raises another concern: because these
technologies are often below the radar or invisible, citizens are denied the opportunity to
complain or offer resistance. See Marx, supra note 19, at 45. This is a weighty problem, and it
might be that excluding all biases is a Sisyphean endeavor. Relatedly, there is the problem of
whether the police will selectively deploy such technology in ways that replicate and
exacerbate unequal policing. See Joh, supra note 205, at 15–16. But certainly any such biases
and selective use can be minimized and monitored. One such method would be through
periodic audits along the lines of what Professor Robin Lenhardt and others have proposed in
the race context. See R. A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 1544–50 (2011); cf.
Jessica Erickson, Racial Impact Statements: Considering the Consequences of Racial
Disproportionalities in the Criminal Justice System, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1455–56 (2014)
(describing how “states should consider more concrete standards for data collection”).
Another possible solution is to solicit more community involvement in the use of
technologies, a solution for which Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko advocate. See
Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1846
(2015) (noting the issues with the lack of availability for public comment or public rulemaking
regarding police rules).
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technology can move us closer to real reasonable suspicion. Technology
can improve policing so that looks, encounters, stops, and frisks turn on
actual reasonable suspicion of criminality rather than the proxy of race.
Put differently, having access to at-a-distance weapons scanners, facial
recognition software, and Big Data can mean the difference between
“[y]oung + [b]lack . . . = [p]robable [c]ause”217 and race-blind policing. It
would certainly mean a drastic reduction in the number of stopped
minorities and indeed a reduction in the number of all stops. Terahertz
scanners would tell the police that the bulge in a black teenager’s jacket
is nothing more than a bulky cellphone, but that white tourist who looks
like he is from Texas really does have a gun. Facial recognition
technology combined with Big Data would tell the police that the brown
driver repeatedly circling the block in fact works in the neighborhood
and is probably looking for a parking space and that the clean-cut white
dude reading a paper on a park bench is in fact a sex offender who, just
by being near a playground, is violating his sex offender registration. It
would tell the police that the black kid running down the street is simply
that, a kid running down the street.218 It would tell them, in a way that is
less intrusive or embarrassing, whether someone is a troublemaker
casing a neighborhood or a student returning home with a bag of Skittles
and an iced tea;219 a loiterer up to no good, or a father waiting to pick up
216. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing unconscious
racism). Lawrence writes:
Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and
beliefs that attach significance to an individual’s race and induce negative feelings and
opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced
all of us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism.
We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our
beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other
words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by
unconscious racial motivation.
Id. at 322.
217. Gaynes, supra note 6, at 621.
218. For example, relying solely on “commonsense[,]” the Court has long held that flight
from police in a high crime area, standing alone, provides reasonable suspicion to justify a
stop. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). In fact, empirical evidence
demonstrates the opposite: “that in high-crime urban communities where the population is
disproportionately minority, flight from an identifiable police officer is a very poor indicator
that crime is afoot.” See Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 733, 792 (2000).
219. The reference is to Trayvon Martin, the unarmed black youth shot by a neighborhood
watchman. See Charles M. Blow, Opinion, The Curious Case of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/opinion/blow-the-curious-case-oftrayvon-martin.html [https://perma.cc/RH59-F3TL]. Access to Big Data, for example, would
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his children from school;220 a burglar about to commit a home invasion,
or a Harvard professor entering his own home;221 a thug with a gun, or a
police chief;222 a trespasser attempting to enter the Capitol Building, or a
Republican senator;223 a mugger looking for his next victim, or the future
United States Attorney General;224 a thief about to burgle a laboratory,
or the world renowned astrophysicist Neil DeGrasse Tyson, guilty only
of “JBB (just being black).”225 And it would tell that the white kid from
New Jersey driving into Harlem is not there to score drugs, but to see his
black girlfriend.226
I promised earlier to make the argument that deploying technology
to aid in policing—alarming as it might seem at first—can also play a
role in tackling the other problems we associate with racialized policing.
The role public surveillance cameras, weapons scanners, and Big Data
likely have told the police that Martin’s father’s girlfriend lived at the gated community,
explaining Martin’s presence there. See Edward J. Blakely, In Gated Communities, Such as
Where Trayvon Martin Died, A Dangerous Mindset, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2012), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-gated-communities-such-as-where-trayvon-martin-died-adangerous-mind-set/2012/04/06/gIQAwWG8zS_story.html?utm_term=.7b3acc664fba [https://
perma.cc/U99C-FDV6]. Had Martin had a history of thefts or break-ins, this too would be
“known” through technology. For an interesting legal analysis of the shooting and the case
that followed, see generally Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit
Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013) (describing the shooting
and the legal case); see also Cynthia Lee, (E)Racing Trayvon Martin, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
91 (2014) (same).
220. See Joanna Rothkoff, “I’m Not Your Brother!”: Video Reveals Police’s Stunning
Double-Standard for Black Americans, SALON (Aug. 29, 2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.salon
.com/2014/08/29/st_paul_cops_tase_and_arrest_black_man_for_waiting_to_pick_his_kids_up
_from_preschool/ [https://perma.cc/PS42-UW3X].
221. The reference is to the arrest of Henry Louis Gates after an officer suspected him of
burglary. See Abby Goodnough, Harvard Professor Jailed; Officer Is Accused of Bias, N.Y.
TIMES (July 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21gates.html [https://perma.cc
/NR4X-NMNL]. As I have detailed elsewhere, a number of “law-abiding minority
professors”—Cornel West, William Julius Wilson, Paul Butler, and Devon Carbado—have
been subjected to police stops. Capers, supra note 9, at 18.
222. See Geoffrey Gardner, White Cop Disciplined for Profiling Black Police Chief, NPR
(May 13, 2008, 5:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/newsandviews/2008/05/nypd_disciplines
_white_officer.html [https://perma.cc/7QEU-3T74].
223. See Louis Nelson, Sen. Tim Scott Reveals Incidents of Being Targeted by Capitol
Police, POLITICO (July 13, 2016, 7:04 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/tim-scottcapitol-racism-senate-225507 [https://perma.cc/75EV-84PV].
224. See Gene Demby, Two Tales of Profiling, from the Highest Offices in the Land, NPR:
CODE SWITCH (July 19, 2013, 7:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/07/19
/203715163/two-tales-of-profiling-from-the-highest-offices-in-the-land [https://perma.cc/M6MK3R8Y] (describing Attorney General Eric Holder’s experience being profiled by the police).
225. See NEIL DEGRASSE TYSON, THE SKY IS NOT THE LIMIT: ADVENTURES OF AN
URBAN ASTROPHYSICIST 134 (2004).
226. As I have documented elsewhere, whites are often targeted for stops in
predominantly minority neighborhoods on the assumption that they are drug purchasers. See
Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, supra note 17, at 66 n.148.
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can play in combatting police violence could even be obvious. Scanners,
for example, could immediately tell officers that a suspect is unarmed,
often enough to obviate the need for deadly force. Big Data could also
tell officers whether a suspect has a history of violence or resisting
arrest.227 Beyond that, public surveillance cameras can capture and make
visible police use of excessive force. Indeed, they could even have
advantages over recordings from body-worn cameras or police vehicle
dashboard cameras. Body-worn cameras and dashboard cameras show
police citizen interactions from the police officer’s perspective.228 While
this perspective is important, especially in cases where officers claim
they acted with honest and reasonable belief, it is not the only
perspective, let alone the most objective one.229 On top of that, there is
legitimate concern that the police, both ex ante and ex post, have the
ability to control and edit the resulting film.230 Indeed, there is evidence
that the officer who shot Laquan McDonald in Chicago tampered with
his dashboard camera231 and evidence that an officer involved in the
shooting of Keith Lamont Scott in Charlotte failed to activate his
camera, in violation of departmental police rules.232 All of this might
undermine the goal of objectivity or capturing the full picture.233 Public

227. Cf. Jouvenal, supra note 193 (discussing the use of technology to evaluate the threat a
person poses).
228. For a discussion of the impact of perspective on objective truth, see Mary D. Fan,
Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 16–18), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract
_id=2773886 [https://perma.cc/BY3D-Y4JE (staff-uploaded archive)].
229. On the role perspective and angle play in determining the “truth” of video evidence,
see Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333, 1335–36
(2010).
230. As one observer put it, the current system, in which the police themselves control
footage of police citizen interactions, is like “the fox guarding the henhouse.” Sarah
Lustbader, The Real Problem with Police Video, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/opinion/the-real-problem-with-police-video.html? _r=0 [https://
perma.cc/55YX-V7QU]; see also Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391,
403 (2016) (“[D]espite its name, community policing efforts remain in control of the
police . . . .”).
231. Sebastian Murdock, The Cop Who Killed Laquan McDonald Had Broken His
Dashcam on Purpose, Report Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2016, 8:42 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chicago-police-damaged-dashcam-microphones_us
_56a952f6e4b0d82286d4e101?utm_hp_ref=black-voices&&utm_hp_ref=black-voices
[https://perma.cc/8CG8-ERXB].
232. Welsey Lowery, Charlotte Officer Did Not Activate Body Camera Until After Keith
Scott Had Been Shot, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/post-nation/wp/2016/09/26/charlotte-officer-did-not-activate-body-camera-until-after-keithscott-had-been-shot-2/?utm_term=.b9c4a0d2021a [https://perma.cc/2ZVK-5UW9].
233. For these reasons, copwatching groups often have strict requirements about how
members should film the police. See Simonson, supra note 230, at 396.
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surveillance cameras, if done properly with public input and control,
bypass these problems.
The role technology can play in addressing underenforcement is
less direct but important too. Quite simply, to the extent technology can
increase accuracy and efficiency in policing, it can free officers to engage
in the work that those of us who are black and brown and white want
them to do: actual policing. Just consider one statistic: police in this
country fail to make an arrest in about one-third of all murders in this
country.234 Allow me to say this again: a full one-third of all murders go
unsolved. And this does not even begin to get at other unsolved crimes,
including violent crimes and financial and property crimes.235 Now
imagine if officers, instead of focusing their resources on black and
brown people who are Terry innocent, redirected their resources to
solve real crimes.
There is much more to be said about using technology to rethink
policing. But for now, here are just a few observations. Technology, in
the form of public surveillance cameras, could very well deter officers
from committing Fourth Amendment violations,236 much in the way they
deter other law breaking. Of equal importance, because public
surveillance cameras are specular, they have the potential to educate
judges about how the Fourth Amendment is really being applied and
thus counter myopic perspectives that already tip the scales in favor of
the police. This last point cannot be overstated since such an education
has the potential to “help change constitutional meaning.”237
Technology, to borrow from Professors Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres,
can serve “demosprudence[.]”238
I end this Part by returning to the case that, in effect, gave its
blessing to racialized policing, Terry v. Ohio. As another policing and
234. See Getting Away with Murder, ECONOMIST (July 4, 2015), http://www.economist
.com/news/united-states/21656725-police-fail-make-arrest-more-third-nations-killings-gettingaway [https://perma.cc/RYT2-4N93]; Martin Kaste, Open Cases: Why One-Third of Murders
in America Go Unresolved, NPR (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/03
/30/395069137/open-cases-why-one-third-of-murders-in-america-go-unresolved [https://perma.cc
/Z7V2-CG28].
235. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2013, at 2 (2013), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.2013/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/clearances/clearancetopic_final [https://perma.cc
/WB95-QJK3] (noting, among other things, that in 2013 only 48.1% of violent crime and
19.7% of property crimes were cleared by arrest or similar disposition).
236. See Simonson, supra note 230, at 425.
237. Id.
238. See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Towards a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2749–50 (2014) (coining
the term “demosprudence” to describe action, instigated by “ordinary people[,]” to change
“the people who make the law and the landscape in which that law is made”).
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technology scholar recently observed, were the facts of Terry to occur
today, an officer would be able to use facial recognition technology and
a data search to learn that Terry—who was observed with his companion
repeatedly peering into a store window—has a prior criminal record and
several prior arrests.239 The detective would learn through pattern
matching links that Terry associates with a known local gangster, Billy
Cox.240 And the detective would learn that Terry, unlike the typical
window shopper, has a substance abuse problem.241 Add to this a longrange scanner, and Detective McFadden would also know that both
Terry and his companion were armed. In short, this information,
combined with the detective’s observation of behavior consistent with
casing a store, would make the detective’s finding of articulable,
reasonable suspicion far stronger and far more reliable. This is the
beauty of using technology to aid policing.
But there is another beauty that is equally important. It can reduce
racialized policing. Two men taking turns looking into a store window
might indicate that criminal activity “may be afoot[,]”242 but then again it
might not. The two men might instead be my shopping buddy and I,
admiring a Marc Jacobs overcoat or a Paul Smith suit in the window of
Barney’s. My shopping buddy and I are black men after all, Terry and
his companion redux. Given the ubiquity of surveillance cameras in the
world I envision, the officers should realize that it is unlikely either of us
would publicly engage in criminal activity, especially something so
public as robbing a store. They would certainly already know that
neither one of us is armed, assuming the officers had already scanned
the entire street with their terahertz scanners. In any event, facial
recognition software and access to data would be able to assure police of
our Terry innocence in seconds. They would learn that I am a law
professor who writes extensively about policing and that I am a former
federal prosecutor.243 There would be no need for me to be “grabbed” or

239. Ferguson, supra note 207, at 377 (citing Louis Stokes, Representing John W. Terry, 72
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 727, 728–29 (1998)).
240. Id. For an excellent discussion of how social networking algorithms are already being
used by Chicago police to know an individual’s connection to other individuals, including
individuals who might not be involved in criminal activity, see Joh, supra note 203, at 25–27.
241. Ferguson, supra note 207, at 377. This information could be “available” through
arrest records, prison intake records, social services records, or a panoply of other records.
242. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
243. They might even learn that I served as chair of the Academic Advisory Council
created under Floyd and that I recently served as a commissioner on New York’s Civilian
Complaint Review Board. The officers would presumably learn that my shopping buddy is a
vice president at an advertising agency. They might even learn that I do not suffer fools
lightly.
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“spun . . . around” or “patted down[.]”244 The two of us, like other lawabiding citizens, would be allowed to shop—or at least window shop.
Lest this sound like I subscribe to a “politics of distinction[,]”245 this
technology would also benefit black and brown folk who cannot claim
the advantages I have. It can benefit the kid from the projects who is
young and black and whose “hat’s real low”246 and who, because of
racialized policing and overcriminalization, has even been busted for
marijuana use a couple of times and jumping a turnstile once, but who
dreams of one day making enough to buy the same Marc Jacobs coat I
am eyeing. Instead of relying on heuristics and implicit biases and race
as
a
proxy
for
criminality
to
conclude
that
“[y]oung + [b]lack + [m]ale = [p]robable [c]ause[,]”247 officers would
already know from their earlier scan of the street that the kid is
unarmed. Facial recognition technology and access to data should
similarly tell them that there is insufficient basis for a forcible stop.
Recreational drug use and turnstile jumping are not probative of casing
a place. Even if they chose to approach the kid and attempt a consensual
encounter or “near-seizure,”248 public surveillance cameras would
capture this, making a record that can later be used to educate judges,
and police officers themselves, about discriminatory policing and thus
potentially “help change constitutional meaning.”249 Even for black and
brown folk who do not share my advantages, this has to be better than
the status quo.
But the larger point is this: With the technology I am advancing,
none of us would need to be singled out because of race. Or more
accurately, everyone else would be subjected to the same soft
surveillance. The Asian woman with the briefcase. The white
businessman trying to hail a cab. The messenger on his bike. The elderly

244. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
245. See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1260 n.20 (1994) (“The position I adopt closely resembles
a strand of thought within African-American communities that Professor Regina Austin
terms the ‘politics of distinction.’ This school of thought stresses ‘the difference that exists
between the “better” elements of [the African American community] and the stereotypical
“lowlifes” who richly merit the bad reputations the dominant society accords them.’ ”)
(quoting Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1772 (1992)).
246. The reference, of course, is to the lyrics in “99 Problems.” See Jay-Z, 99 Problems, on
THE BLACK ALBUM (Def Jam Records 2003).
247. Gaynes, supra note 6, at 621.
248. See Ristroph, supra note 82 (manuscript at 12) (using the term “near-seizure” to
describe what courts deem consensual encounters and outside the Fourth Amendment, but
which in fact tend to be experienced as coercive and anything but consensual).
249. Simonson, supra note 230, at 425.
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woman walking her poodle. Everyone. Certainly, this gets us closer to
equality before the law.
III. THE REDISTRIBUTION OF PRIVACY
Still, I can imagine the hesitation, especially from civil libertarians
and progressives. What I am proposing, after all, is more policing, not
less. In exchange for deracialized policing, there will have to be more
policing of everyone, albeit in the form of soft surveillance. I am
essentially proposing that some people cede some of the privacy that
they currently enjoy for the greater good of everyone. My task, then, is
to show that the sacrifice will be worth it. In doing so, I will have to
expose a raw truth: that privacy has always been unequal, and it is past
time that it was redistributed. But first, I turn to a far more conventional
argument to support my proposals: that equalizing privacy can support
perceptions of legitimacy and counter legal cynicism.
A. Legitimacy and Legal Cynicism
As Tom Tyler demonstrated decades ago in his highly influential
Why People Obey the Law,250 punishment plays a relatively minor role in
inducing compliance with the law.251 Far more important are the roles
societal and community norms play in policing behavior.252 More
important too are perceptions of legitimacy.253 The more individuals
believe that the law is both fair and fairly applied, the more likely it is
that those individuals will comply with the law.254 Tyler’s Chicago study
is a case in point. At its most basic, his longitudinal study of randomly
selected Chicago residents found that heightened perceptions of
legitimacy increase compliance with the law.255 Tyler has also examined
the role legitimacy plays among blacks and Hispanics with a particular
focus on “high-risk” individuals, namely black and Hispanic males
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.256 His findings were
consistent: perceptions of legitimacy play a significant role in voluntary
compliance with the law.257 Janice Nadler’s research adds another data
point to legitimacy theory.258 Her research suggests that, just as
250. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–4 (1990).
251. See id.
252. See, e.g., Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, supra note 17, at 838.
253. TYLER, supra note 250, at 57.
254. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 67–68 (2002).
255. See TYLER, supra note 250, at 8–15.
256. See Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 376 (2001).
257. Id. at 375–82.
258. See Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2005).
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perceptions of legitimacy contribute to voluntary compliance with the
law, perceptions of illegitimacy contribute to its very opposite,
noncompliance.259 Indeed, her research is consistent with Judge
Brandeis’s intuition in his oft-cited dissent in Olmstead v. United
States,260 a case involving the government’s use of wiretaps, without first
obtaining a warrant, to listen in on conversations.261 Judge Brandeis
wrote, “If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.”262
The perception of illegitimacy has particular consequences for the
problems of police violence, underenforcement, and racial profiling.
Law enforcement’s very prevalence in black and brown communities
contributes to the perception that the police are “above the law[,]”263
“just another gang[,]”264 an occupying force.265 Instead of inducing
compliance with the law, racialized policing contributes to minorities
feeling less obliged to obey the law or defer to legal authorities.266
Equally troubling, it might induce law breaking.267 It is thus unsurprising
that the Final Report of the White House Task Force on 21st Century
Policing from May 2015 emphasizes increasing legitimacy as crucial to
police reform.268 Even more recently, Monica Bell has built upon the
insights of legitimacy theory to add “legal cynicism”—the feeling shared
by many of us who are black and brown that we are “essentially
stateless, unprotected by the law and its enforcers, marginal to the
259. See id. at 1410–11. Other scholars have made similar arguments. See DAVID COLE,
NO EQUAL JUSTICE 171–72 (1999); James Forman, Jr., Children, Cops, and Citizenship: Why
Conservatives Should Oppose Racial Profiling, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT 150, 150–51 (Marc
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (arguing that inner city youth respond to racial
profiling and other undemocratic policing by disregarding authority).
260. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
261. See id. at 455.
262. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
263. See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE
AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE (1993) (referring to the language used in the title).
264. See David K. Shipler, Living Under Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 1997), http://www
.nytimes.com/1997/02/07/opinion/living-under-suspicion.html [https://perma.cc/NS5T-5XBR].
265. See generally NAACP, BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN INVESTIGATION OF
POLICE CONDUCT IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES (1995) (describing how police use excessive
force in minority communities).
266. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 247 (2008) (testing the
hypothesis that “the link between legitimacy and cooperation differs across ethnic groups”).
267. See Nadler, supra note 258, at 1401; see also Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and
Testilying, supra note 17, at 862–66.
268. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 9 (May 2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov
/pdf/taskforce/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/PCN7-R3D3].
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project of making American society.”269 Bell’s legal cynicism theory thus
identifies another barrier to equal policing and, in turn, equal
citizenship.
The point here is straightforward. To the extent technology can
deracialize policing, it can increase perceptions of legitimacy, which in
turn can increase voluntary compliance with the law. So here is the first
argument for using technology to deracialize policing: it can reduce
crime. Of equal importance, it can counter the feeling of legal cynicism
that pervades many minority communities and thus further the goal of
belonging and equal citizenship. And that, in turn, benefits everyone.
B.

The Redistribution of Privacy

My primary argument to support more technology to deracialize
policing turns on the redistribution of privacy. But an emendation could
be useful. Instead of thinking of it as the redistribution of privacy, it
might help to think of it as the equalizing of privacy. Because this is the
hard truth: privacy has never been distributed equally.270 Those who are
privileged have always enjoyed a surfeit. And if we care about equality,
then we should also care about equalizing privacy. I will return to this
point in a minute. First, I should elaborate on what I mean when I say
that privacy has never been equal. I begin with a news item that will be
familiar to many but strikes a particular chord with those of us who are
black or brown.
On January 23, 2012, Senator Rand Paul was attempting to board a
flight from Nashville to Washington, D.C., when he refused a
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) security pat down and,
as one newspaper put it, set off “a mini-firestorm[.]”271 It mattered little
that the actual incident was quickly resolved.272 His father, then
Representative Ron Paul, at the time engaged in his own presidential
bid, took to his campaign’s official Twitter account and stated: “My son
269. Bell, supra note 65 (manuscript at 2).
270. Professor Bill Stuntz made this point some years ago. See Stuntz, supra note 23, at
1266 (“Fourth Amendment law makes wealthier suspects better off than they otherwise
would be, and may make poorer suspects worse off.”). Younger scholars have expressed a
renewed interest in exposing and challenging unequal privacy. See Michele Estrin Gilman,
The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1389, 1389–90 (2012); Mary
Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript
at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2863343## [https://perma.cc
/MMT8-A6RP (staff-uploaded archive)].
271. Kathleen Hennessey, Sen. Rand Paul Refuses TSA Pat-Down, Is Kept Off Flight, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/24/nation/la-na-rand-paul-tsa20120124 [https://perma.cc/FY3Y-AW7L].
272. Id. Senator Rand Paul found another flight and was “rescreened without incident[.]”
Id.
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@SenRandPaul being detained by TSA for refusing full body pat down
after anomaly in body scanner in Nashville.”273 The elder Paul also
vowed to dismantle the TSA if he were elected president, stating,
The police state in this country is growing out of control. One of
the ultimate embodiments of this is the TSA that gropes and grabs
our children, our seniors, and our loved ones and neighbors with
disabilities. The TSA does all of this while doing nothing to keep
us safe.274
This was not the first time someone had complained about TSA
screenings and privacy. Prior to Senator Paul’s incident, Texas Governor
Rick Perry had pushed a state bill that would criminalize “intrusive”
airport pat downs.275 The Alaska State Legislature, after a “humiliating”
pat down of one of its members, had passed a resolution, declaring that
“no one should have to sacrifice their dignity in order to travel.”276 There
had even been a “Don’t Touch My Junk” movement after a passenger
posted a YouTube video of himself refusing a TSA pat down with the
words, “If you touch my junk, I’m gonna have you arrested.”277
The point here is not to trivialize calls for less intrusive airport
searches, a topic I have addressed in other work.278 Rather, the point is
to situate these calls against the reduced privacy routinely experienced a
million times over279 by those of us who are black or brown and who are
driving,280 or simply exercising the “right of locomotion.”281 Viewed
273. Ron Paul (@RonPaul), TWITTER (Jan. 23, 2012, 10:22 AM), https://www.twitter.com
/RonPaul/status/161468829996826625 [http://perma.cc/T6AN-VFGV].
274. Hennessey, supra note 271.
275. Stephen Ceasar, Texas Gov. Rick Perry Revives TSA Pat-Down Bill, L.A. TIMES
(June 25, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/25/nation/la-na-texas-tsa-20110626
[https://perma.cc/PJP8-HR9V].
276. See H.R. Res. 8, 37th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2011); Kim Murphy, Alaska Legislator’s
‘No’ to TSA Pat-Down Wins Praise at Home, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011), http://articles.latimes
.com/2011/feb/24/nation/la-na-tsa-screening-20110225-1 [https://perma.cc/ST9Q-3V5V].
277. Chris McGreal, ‘Don’t Touch My Junk’ Passenger Sparks Revolt Against Airport
Searches, GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov
/19/dont-touch-junk-airport-searches [https://perma.cc/7R5Y-LZKU] (describing the “revolt”
resulting from John Tyner’s refusal to submit to a pat-down search).
278. See I. Bennett Capers, Unsexing the Fourth Amendment, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855,
873–75 (2015).
279. These frisks have also been criticized as sexual, both by law professor Paul Butler and
by rap groups. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk: Sex, Torture, Control, in LAW AS
PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION 155, 166 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011); N.W.A., Fuck
the Police, on STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON (Ruthless/Priority 1988) (complaining about
police “grabbing his nuts”).
280. Those of us who are black and brown are far more likely, following a “routine” traffic
stop, to be asked to exit the vehicle, to be asked for consent to search the vehicle, and to be
treated as criminal suspects. See Capers, supra note 9, at 16 (citing studies about minorities
being stopped at traffic stops).
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against this larger backdrop, the assault on privacy felt by Senator Rand
Paul and others reveals itself to be one of the many ways that privacy is
distributed unequally. To Senator Paul and others, to be delayed and
patted down at an airport was unprecedented and humiliating. For those
of us of a darker hue (including those who appear to be Arab or
Muslim), such looks, stops, and frisks are part of the way we live now
and have lived for a long time.282
A similar observation can be made about the outcry that greeted
Edward Snowden’s revelations about the U.S. government’s domestic
spying program283 or even more recent discussions about the
government’s efforts to force Apple to de-encrypt its iPhones.284 The
Snowden revelation sparked a national conversation about domestic
surveillance, privacy, and even tools for evading surveillance.285 But as
Mary Anne Franks observes, “The privacy movement . . . has tended to
center on the concerns of the privileged.”286 Jane Bailey, a critical
feminist, is even more blunt:
It seems to me that [the response to NSA spying] has arisen
because privileged white men feel exposed now. And for some
reason it annoys me that they are acting like they’ve “discovered”
surveillance for the first time and when they do it’s almost always
with a myopic civil libertarian focus on state power. The fact of
the matter is members of subordinated groups have known the
power and technologies of surveillance for some time. For these

281. See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment
on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1259–60 (1990).
282. See, e.g., Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 217–18 (2005) (“[T]he title [Walking While Muslim] suggests that
certain people are being targeted for no legitimate purpose.”).
283. See, e.g., Janet Reitman, Snowden and Greenwald: The Men Who Leaked the Secrets,
ROLLING STONE (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-andgreenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204 [https://perma.cc/A342-JWZD].
284. See Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to
San Bernardino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016
/02/16/69b903ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html [https://perma.cc/N662-4E62].
285. For a discussion of surveillance evasion, see Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests:
Surveillance Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspicion, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 998 (2013).
286. Franks, supra note 270 (manuscript at 4); see also David Lyon, Surveillance as Social
Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies, in SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING 13, 19
(David Lyon ed., 2003) (“Lower socio-economic groups and women have long been
accustomed to the gaze of various surveillants.”).
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groups, surveillance is and always has been inescapably noticeable
because it is part of everyday life.287
That we have a history of unequal privacy might surprise those who
have always taken privacy for granted. But for the rest of us, again, this
lack of privacy is nothing new. Indeed, to some extent, unequal privacy
is all that we have ever known. This is especially true of what I term
“unequal private privacy.” Black slaves were certainly denied the luxury
of privacy. They certainly could not assert the right to be “secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects[.]”288 As persons, or more accurately
“chattels personal[,]”289 security was entirely foreign. They were simply
commodities, bought and sold, auctioned based on their bodies to better
determine their value,290 raped, and, like chattel, bred.291 As for papers,
“one of the unifying tenets of slave codes was that blacks should not
read[,]”292 a tenet that was codified in several states, including North
Carolina.293 To have paper with writing on it was enough to subject
slaves to corporal punishment, including whipping, branding, and, in
some cases, amputation.294 And as far as the papers that were
occasionally allowed—passes or free papers—these were subject to
inspection and rejection at any time by slave patrols.295 As for houses
and effects, as property themselves, slaves had none to claim as their
own. Above all, these slaves were subjected to constant monitoring, as
the common practice of using overseers and slave patrols—one of the
287. Jane Bailey, “Gendering Big Brother”: What Should a Feminist Do? 4 (May 12, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2605481
[https://perma.cc/9BPM-PU2Z (staff-uploaded archive)].
288. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
289. See KENNETH M. STAMP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 197 (1956). Of course, there
was a contradiction in the notion that slaves were at once property and responsible and liable
as persons for their acts. For more on this contradiction, see GENOVESE, supra note 30, at 30–
31; A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The “Law Only as an Enemy”: The
Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of
Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 971–75 (1992).
290. See WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL: LIFE INSIDE THE ANTEBELLUM SLAVE
MARKET 20 (1999).
291. See I. Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 865 (2013);
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical
Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 81–82, 81 n.297 (1999); Thelma
Jennings, “Us Colored Women Had to Go Through a Plenty”: Sexual Exploitation of AfricanAmerican Slave Women, 1 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 45, 46 (1990) (describing the forced “breeding”
of slaves).
292. I. Bennett Capers, Reading Back, Reading Black, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 19 (2006).
293. See, e.g., An Act to Prevent All Persons from Teaching Slaves to Read or Write, the
Use of Figures Excepted, ch. 6, 1830–1831 N.C. Sess. Laws 11, 11; Capers, supra note 289, at
19.
294. Capers, supra note 292, at 20.
295. See HADDEN, supra note 31, at 117; TASLITZ, supra note 31, at 106.
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precursors to the modern day police296—attests to. Such unequal privacy
was not limited to the South. In New York City, for example, there were
lantern laws, or ordinances “For Regulating Negroes and Slaves in the
Night Time.”297 Under these lantern laws, blacks on streets “an hour
after Sun-set” had to be accompanied by “some White Person[.]”298
Otherwise, they must carry a “[lantern] and lighted Candle in it, so as
the light thereof may be plainly seen[.]”299 As Simone Browne observes,
these lantern laws “made it possible for the black body to be constantly
illuminated from dusk to dawn, made knowable, locatable, and
contained within the city.”300
Even today, unequal private privacy is the norm. Those of us who
are black or brown continue to be subjected to private surveillance by
other citizens when shopping,301 when driving,302 when flying,303 when
walking,304 and even when entering our own homes.305

296. As Carol Steiker has persuasively argued, the modern police force is traceable to the
“slave patrols,” which developed many of the aspects of modern policing that we recognize,
such as uniforms, arms, and military drilling. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 839 (1994); see also KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR
ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA 63–65 (3d ed. 2015) (“[T]he South
developed distinctive policing practices . . . . [c]alled ‘slave patrols,’ ‘alarm men,’ or
‘searchers[]’ . . . .”).
297. See City of New York, A Law for Regulating Negroes and Slaves in the Night Time
(Apr.
22,
1731),
https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/8ebdde86-d7f2-c140-e040e00a18060af7 [https://perma.cc/VK4B-F8B5].
298. Id.
299. Id. For more on New York’s lantern laws, see SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS:
ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 76–83 (2015).
300. BROWNE, supra note 299, at 79.
301. See Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV 1071, 1074–
78 (2017) (documenting instances of private surveillance and erroneous accusations); Dana
Farrington, Macy’s To Pay $650,000 in Settlement over Alleged Racial Profiling, NPR (Aug.
20, 2014, 8:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/08/20/342005509/macys-topay-650-000-in-settlement-over-alleged-racial-profiling [https://perma.cc/D5HQ-CQ8F]; J.
David Goodman, Profiling Complaints by Black Shoppers Followed Changes to Stores’
Security Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/30
/nyregion/black-shoppers-at-barneys-and-macys-say-they-were-profiled-by-security.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/77QA-992X]; Michelle Singletary, Shopping While Black, WASH. POST (Oct.
31, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/shopping-while-black/2013/10/31
/5c7129d4-41a4-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc_story.html [https://perma.cc/W7KP-THAG].
302. See, e.g., Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing how a “private
motorist” summoned the police when he observed “three dark-skinned males, handling an
expensive video recorder” while driving through an affluent neighborhood). The Hispanic
men were handcuffed, searched spread eagle, and only let go when a canvass of the
neighborhood failed to reveal a robbery. Id.
303. See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1577 (2002).
Recently, the comedian Aasif Mandvi shared his “rules” for flying while brown, highlighting
the hyper-scrutiny often given to those who appear Muslim. Aasif Mandvi Shares His Flight Safety
Rules for Brown People, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 23, 2016, 8:18 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
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But it is the problem of what I term “unequal public privacy,” or
privacy vis-à-vis the government, that is my focus. It is one thing when
citizens treat each other unequally. It is another thing entirely when the
state engages in such unequal treatment,306 though the two are linked
and reinforce one another.307 Quite simply, black and brown folk are
more likely to be watched by the police, stopped by the police, and
frisked by the police. In the everyday world of policing, we are treated as
the “panoptic sort,”308 and as “always already suspect.”309 Scholars refer
to this phenomenon as “hypervisibility[.]”310 But this term is only partly
accurate and obscures an important predicate. To be sure, those of us
who are black or brown are often hyper-visible vis-à-vis the police. But
this is largely because the police subject us to hyper-surveillance, or to
repurpose a legal term, “heightened scrutiny.”
Allow me to end with an example that serves as a bookend to the
example I started with involving Senator Rand Paul. Consider the story
of Tunde Clement, a black man who was traveling from New York City
to Albany, New York, and was carrying a backpack, which alone
apparently was enough to subject him to a racially inflected look, stop,
and encounter.311 According to news reports, the officers “cornered
Clement and began peppering him with questions.”312 The officers then
handcuffed him, at which point
[h]e was taken to a station to be strip-searched and then to a
hospital, where doctors forcibly sedated him with a cocktail of
powerful drugs . . . . A camera was inserted in his rectum, he was
.com/entry/aasif-mandvi-flight-safety-brown-people_us_58358ea0e4b000af95ed4f22?section=us
_comedy [https://perma.cc/5W7Q-JKXP].
304. See Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, supra note 17, at 60.
305. See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946,
959–62 (2002) (describing his own experience being surrounded by the police and pinned
against a wall at gunpoint outside his sister’s apartment after a neighbor reported seeing
several black men enter the apartment); see also Goodnough, supra note 221 (describing the
arrest of Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. while entering his own home after a white
neighbor called the police suspecting a possible break-in).
306. One such consequence is the perception of unequal citizenship. See AMY E. LERMAN
& VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP 158–59 (2014).
307. Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, supra note 17, at 68.
308. This is a play on Oscar Gandy’s term about database marketing. See OSCAR GANDY,
THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 1 (1993).
309. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory, 93
N.C. L. REV. 1339, 1363 (2015).
310. See GEORGE YANCY, BLACK BODIES, WHITE GAZES: THE CONTINUING
SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 75 (2008).
311. Brendan J. Lyons, Harsh, Unwarranted Tactics?: Outcry over Sheriff’s Department
Search Methods, TIMES UNION (May 14, 2008), http://www.informationliberation.com/?id
=25252 [https://perma.cc/3LEJ-MDFK].
312. Id.
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forced to vomit and his blood and urine were tested for drugs and
alcohol. Scans of his digestive system were performed using X-ray
machines, according to hospital records obtained by the Times
Union. The search, conducted without a warrant, came up
empty.313
After ten hours in custody, Clement was given an appearance ticket
for resisting arrest and released; the charge was later dismissed.314
According to the local defense bar, Clement’s experience was far from
unique. As one defense lawyer put it, pursuant to Albany police
interdiction policy, “every black man who came through the bus station
was being literally grabbed and dragged into the men’s room and
searched . . . . Occasionally, of course, they would get lucky and find
some drugs. But the vast, overwhelming majority of black men searched
were clean.”315
So this is the hard truth. For many Americans, being subjected to
“heightened scrutiny” when they go through airport surveillance might
be new, humiliating, and unsettling. But for those of us of the darker
hue, there is a different story entirely. My final argument then is this:
although the technology I have been advancing could mean that
Americans who currently enjoy privacy might have to cede some in
terms of more widespread soft surveillance, this more widespread
surveillance will have the benefit of distributing privacy more equally.
For this too is the hard truth: the goal of true equality will be an exercise
in futility if we are only talking about the poor, about the downtrodden,
and about those of us who are black and brown. We must also talk about
those who are privileged and what privileges must be shared by all. In
short, to the same extent that technology can deracialize and de-bias
policing, it can also redistribute privacy among citizens in a way that is
more egalitarian and consistent with our democratic ideals. Indeed, it
could even have the potential to better distribute privacy between
citizens and the police, since there too lies a troubling imbalance.
To be sure, the techno-policing I am advocating will not be a
complete cure-all in terms of leveling privacy imbalances and making
policing more fair, especially given how interconnected and how
networked316 every aspect of our criminal justice system is. But of this
much I am sure: it is a significant step in the right direction.

313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. For a discussion of network theory, see Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, Our
Criminal Network, and The Wire, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 459, 468 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
I am a black man. For me, the personal is the political. It is
inseparable from how I think about the Fourth Amendment, how I think
about policing, and how I think about the way we live now. That is why I
have tried to make an argument for more technology in policing, even if
it means, or perhaps I should say especially if it means, the redistribution
of privacy. The costs, especially to those who already enjoy an
abundance of privacy, might seem great. But even greater should be
possibility of what we can become. A fairer society. A more just society.
A society where, just possibly, all of us, including those of us who are
black and brown, can be equal before the law. In short, a society that
gets us closer to the dream the Founders could not have imagined but
was there all along in the text, waiting to be born. Or to be truly read.
But already, I am getting ahead of myself. So for now, in this liminal
moment, allow me to return to policing. If the goal is equality in
policing, if the goal is efficiency and transparency and crime reduction,
this Essay maps a route there.

